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PINNING OPINION TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT MAT
I. INTRODUCTION
While shaving with your favorite Norelco razor, you pick up the
New York Times ("The Times"), glance at the sports commentary page,
and spy the heading "Victor Kiam is a classic liar."1
You are Victor Kiam. You let loose a stream of four- and five-letter
words and cry bloody libel. You know that libel is an accusation in writ-
ing or printing against someone's character that injures that person's rep-
utation, either generally or with respect to occupation.2 Will you be able
to sue and recover against The Times in a defamation action?
Yes, is the most likely answer, based on the United States Supreme
Court's recent decision in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.
("Milkovich"). 3 Prior to this decision, a majority of lower courts had
interpreted the Constitution to protect expressions found to be opinion.4
The Milkovich Court, however, held that no separate opinion privilege
existed in addition to established constitutional protections for free
speech.5 The Court's holding makes clear that the first amendment of
the United States Constitution6 does not provide to all statements of
opinion an automatic shield from defamation actions.7 Opinion that
"reasonably implies false and defamatory facts" may be found libelous.8
1. Victor Kiam, owner of the New England Patriots football team and frequent television
promoter of his Remington shaving products company, was accused of calling a female re-
porter a "classic bitch." Reporters allegedly overheard Kiam make this comment following a
Patriots game on September 23, 1990, in response to an incident that had occurred six days
earlier. During a post-practice interview on September 17, 1990 in the Patriots' locker room,
team members had allegedly sexually harassed Lisa Olson, a sportswriter for the Boston Her-
ald. Afterward, Kiam publicly denied that he had called Ms. Olson a "bitch," but took out
full-page advertisements in the New York Times and Boston Globe apologizing to her. Rawl-
ings, Make Kiam Pay For His Weaseling, The Sporting News, Oct. 8, 1990, at 40.
2. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 824 (5th ed. 1979).
3. 110 S. Ct. 2695 (1990).
4. See cases cited supra note 181 (holding expressions of opinion as protected); infra text
accompanying notes 182-91.
5. 110 S. Ct. at 2707.
6. The first amendment of the United States Constitution provides in relevant part:
"Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ...." U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
7. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2705-06 (1990).
8. See id. at 2706-07. In cases involving a public official or public figure, courts may
allow recovery if the plaintiff proves that the statement was made with actual malice - knowl-
edge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). In suits brought by private
individuals, defendants may be found liable if the plaintiff makes some showing of fault. Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974). The nonpublic plaintiff may also recover
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In Milkovich, the Court concluded that a sports writer's statements
in a newspaper column implied that a high school wrestling coach had
perjured himself in a judicial proceeding.9 The Court held that the impli-
cation that the coach had committed perjury was sufficiently factual to be
susceptible to being proven true or false, and might permit recovery for
defamation. I° Under this holding, Victor Kiam could sue The Times for
libel if he shows that the newspaper's opinion implies false and defama-
tory facts capable of being disproven."
This note will argue that the Supreme Court's narrowing of consti-
tutional protection for statements of opinion and the application of its
"opinion implicating fact" rule were erroneous. The Court timidly failed
to sanction an exemption in defamation law for expressions deemed to be
opinion - a privilege that has been approved by a majority of state
courts and all federal appellate courts for the last sixteen years. 2 Fur-
ther, the majority Court misanalyzed the editorial comments in the facts
before it.' 3 The Court should have found that the statements made by
sportswriter J. Theodore Diadiun in the News-Herald contained qualifi-
ers that would have cautioned any reasonable reader as to the truth of his
implications. I4 Read in context, the statements could not reasonably be
interpreted as implying a factual assertion, and were not actionable.15
Alternatively, the Court should have sanctioned judicial, if not con-
stitutional, protection for certain types of opinion-based journalism. Be-
cause of the uniquely subjective and socially valuable content of
reviews, 16 columns, 17 editorials,'" and cartoons,' 9 this author advocates
punitive damages upon proving actual malice. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2704 (citing Gertz 418
U.S. at 350).
9. 110 S. Ct. at 2707.
10. Id.
11. See id.; Goodale, 'Milkovich" A Modest Loss for the Press, N.Y. L.J., June 27, 1990, at
2, col. 3. However, Kiam - a public figure - may recover damages only if the statement was
made with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard for its falsity or truth. See
supra note 8.
12. Greenhouse, High Court Narrows Shield in Libel Law, N.Y. Times, June 22, 1990, at
A17, col. 4. See also infra notes 181-91 and accompanying text (citing state and federal deci-
sions that have held opinion to be protected).
13. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2709 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
14. Id. at 2711.
15. Id. at 2710-11.
16. R. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 6.12[8], at 6-50 (1990). See also Greer v. Co-
lumbus Monthly Publishing Corp., 4 Ohio App. 3d 235, 238, 448 N.E.2d 157, 161 (1982)
(finding that reviews of theatre, film, and restaurants constitute the opinion of the reviewer).
17. See Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 986-87 (1984); infra text accompanying notes 366-
77, 398-406.
18. See id. at 986; R. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 6.12[4], at 6-45 to 6-46 (1990);
infra text accompanying notes 366-77, 398-406.
19. See R. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 6.12[4], at 6-45 (1990); King, What's So
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that they should receive first amendment shelter or judicial leniency.
Strong policy reasons support the adoption of this area of protection for
newspapers and their contributing journalists.2'
Finally, this note will discuss the implications and consequences of
the Court's elimination of full constitutional protection for statements
found to be opinion. The impact of the Milkovich decision on libel litiga-
tion and public expression of opinion is likely to be adverse and wide-
spread.2 Libel law experts predict that free journalistic writing will
become chilled22 or exaggerated, 23 defamation claims will proliferate
24
and proceed fully to costly trials,25 resulting in many more defeats for the
press, 26 and lay defendants may be subject to vengeful and meritless defa-
mation suits.
27
Funny About Washington?, N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1990, § 6 (Magazine), at 32, col. 4; infra text
accompanying notes 374-77, 398-406.
20. See Gross, Opinions Left Unprotected by Supreme Court Ruling, Pa. L.J.-Rep., Aug. 6,
1990, at 4, col. 1; infra text accompanying notes 389-407 (policy reasons for protecting opin-
ion-journalism).
21. See infra text accompanying notes 407-69 (impact of Milkovich decision on libel litiga-
tion and first amendment freedoms).
22. Sitomer, Can 'Opinion' Be Libelous?, Christian Sci. Monitor, Aug. 9, 1990, at 14, col.
2; King, What's So Funny About Washington?, N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1990, § 6 (Magazine), at
32, col. 5.
23. Greenhouse, High Court Narrows Shield in Libel Law, N.Y. Times, June 22, 1990, at
A 17, col. 6 (quoting Jane E. Kirtley, attorney and executive director of the Reporters Commit-
tee for Freedom of the Press).
24. Moore, Press Clipping, 22 NAT'L J. 3086 (1990) (stating that over the past twelve
months, an embattled news media has "confronted legal challenges to their long-cherished
independence," and that many media lawyers "worry that more such suits are in store"; and
quoting Bruce Sanford, a Washington, D.C. media lawyer at the Cleveland-based law firm of
Baker & Hostetler, as stating that the Milkovich decision "has already spawned new libel cases,
in large part because its language isn't clear"); Marcus & Pink, Statements of Opinion Can Be
Libelous, Court Rules,- Expressions With 'False and Defamatory' Facts Not Automatically
Shielded, Justices Find, Wash. Post, June 22, 1990, at A4, col. 1 (libel law experts warn that
the Milkovich ruling could encourage more plaintiffs to bring libel suits); Resnick, Florida Case
Tests Libel Ruling, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 24, 1990, at 27, col. 3 (quoting Bruce Sanford, who
predicts further litigation against newspaper editorials); Streitfeld, Author Sues Over Negative
Review; Criticism Was Libelous, D. C. Writer Charges, Wash. Post, Aug. 24, 1990, at Cl, col. 1
(legal experts agree that courts will probably see heavy traffic in libel cases after Milkovich).
25. Streitfeld, Author Sues Over Negative Review; Criticism Was Libelous, D.C. Writer
Charges, Wash. Post, Aug. 24, 1990, at Cl, col. 1 (quoting Bruce Sanford: "It's going to
spawn at least a decade of expensive and extraordinarily time-consuming litigation for the
courts"); Moore, Press Clipping, 22 NAT'L J. 3086 (1990). See Goodale, 'Milkovich " A Modest
Loss for the Press, N.Y. L.J., June 27, 1990, at 2, col. 4-5; Levine, Fear and Libel in the News-
room, Tex. Law., Aug. 13, 1990, at 22.
26. Moore, Press Clipping, 22 NAT'L J. 3086 (1990).
27. See Hentoff, Wrestling With the First Amendment, Wash. Post, June 30, 1990, at A19.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.: Statement of the Facts
Michael Milkovich,2" now retired, was the head wrestling coach
at Maple Heights High School in Ohio.29 On February 9, 1974,
Milkovich's team was involved in a fracas at a home wrestling match
with a team from Mentor High School.3 ° Allegedly, a Maple Heights
wrestler fouled and apparently injured a Mentor High wrestler during a
match.3" When officials awarded the match to the injured Mentor wres-
tler by forfeiture, Milkovich became visibly upset and made "hand ges-
tures" to show his disgust.3 2 Immediately afterward, two Maple Heights
wrestlers left their bench and attacked at least one Mentor wrestler.3 3 As
a result, wrestlers and fans of both teams left their seats, and a melee
began.3 4 Milkovich was in the middle of the altercation at all times,
either attempting to separate fighting wrestlers or observing the confu-
sion.35 Four Mentor wrestlers suffered injuries and had to be taken to
the hospital for treatment.36 Photographs of the events showed
Milkovich watching the fracas.3 7
To investigate the incident, the Ohio High School Athletic Associa-
tion (OHSAA) held a hearing, at which Milkovich and H. Don Scott,
then superintendent of Maple Heights Public School, testified.3 8 After
the hearing, OHSAA placed the Maple Heights team on probation for a
year and disqualified the team for the 1975 state tournament.39 OHSAA
also censured Milkovich for his actions during the fight."°
28. During Milkovich's tenure as a wrestling coach, he achieved a record of 265 wins and
25 losses. He won ten state titles, finished second in the state of Ohio nine times, and placed
third in the state twice. He coached 480 champion wrestlers, and coached the world champi-
onship team against the Soviet Union. He received a National Coach of the Year Award, a
congressional record citation, a United States Wrestling Federation Award, and was inducted
into the Helms Foundation [national] Amateur Wrestling Hall of Fame. Brief of Respondents
at 1-3, Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695 (1990) (No. 89-645).
29. Maple Heights is a town near Cleveland, Ohio. Clayton, High Court No Federal Privi-
lege for 'Opinion' Found Defamatory, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 27, 1990, at 27, col. 1.
30. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2698 (1990); Brief of Respondents at
4, Milkovich (No. 89-645).
31. Brief of Respondents at 4, Milkovich (No. 89-645).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Brief of Respondents at 4, Milkovich (No. 89-645).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 6.
38. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2698 (1990).
39. Id.
40. Id. The Ohio Athletic Commission's written censure of Milkovich, issued on March 5,
1974, read:
From the reports studied by the State Board they were of the unanimous opinion that
[Vol. 11
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Subsequently, several wrestlers and their parents brought suit
against OHSAA in the Court of Common Pleas, Franklin County, Ohio,
seeking a restraining order against OHSAA's ruling on the ground that
they had been denied due process in the OHSAA proceeding.4' Both
Milkovich and Scott testified at the court hearing.42 Milkovich testified
that he saw no fighting or unruliness on the part of any Maple Heights
wrestler.4" On January 7, 1975, the court reversed OHSAA's probation
and ineligibility orders on procedural due process grounds.'
The day after this decision, sportswriter J. Theodore Diadiun's col-
umn appeared in the Willoughby News-Herald, a local newspaper serving
Lake County, Ohio.45 The News-Herald is owned by Lorain Journal
Company and has a circulation of approximately 27,000.46 The column
bore the heading "Maple beat the law with the 'big lie.' , Beneath this
heading was Diadiun's photograph and the words "TD Says."4 The
carryover page headline announced " . . . Diadiun says Maple told a
lie."4 9 Diadiun had attended the wrestling match, interviewed spectators
regarding the incident, and read press accounts of the melee.5 ° He had
also been present at the OHSAA proceeding.5" He did not attend the
court hearing, but interviewed Dr. Harold Meyer, the Commissioner of
OHSAA, who had been present.52 Based on Dr. Meyer's suspicious re-
action to Milkovich's court testimony,5" and Diadiun's own perception of
you were derelict in your responsibility to insure that members of your wrestling
team conducted themselves the way high school athletes are expected to. There was
a distinct feeling that if you had taken proper precautions your team would have not
become involved with the Mentor High wrestlers. Coaches have a great responsibil-
ity in crowd control and it all begins with, first of all, controlling yourself and mem-
bers of your team and if this is done in a proper manner crowd control then becomes
a very minor problem.
Brief of Respondents at 5, Milkovich (No. 89-645).
41. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2698.
42. Id.
43. Brief of Respondents at 6, Milkovich (No. 89-645).
44. Id. at 7.
45. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2698 (1990); Brief of Respondents at
7, Milkovich (No. 89-645).
46. Brief of Respondents at 3, 7, Milkovich (No. 89-645). J. Theodore Diadiun, a sports
reporter, had followed Milkovich's coaching career since 1967. Id. at 4.
47. 110 S. Ct. at 2698. See Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243 app. at 277, 496
N.E.2d 699 app. at 727 (1986).
48. 110 S. Ct. at 2698. The letters "TD" are J. Theodore Diadiun's initials.
49. Id.
50. Brief of Respondents at 4, Milkovich (No. 89-645).
51. Id. at 5.
52. Id. at 6.
53. Id. Dr. Meyer reportedly stated, "I can say that some of the stories told to the judge
sounded pretty darned unfamiliar. It certainly sounded different from what they told us."
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2699 n.2 (1990). Dr. Meyer also told
1991]
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the falsity of Milkovich's testimony at the OHSAA proceeding,54
Diadiun wrote the following excerpted passages in his column:
S. . [A] lesson was learned (or relearned) yesterday by the
student body of Maple Heights High School ....
It is simply this: If you get in a jam, lie your way out.
If you're successful enough, and powerful enough, and can
sound sincere enough, you stand an excellent chance of making
the lie stand up, regardless of what really happened.
Anyone who attended the meet.., knows in his heart that
Milkovich and Scott lied at the hearing after each having given
his solemn oath to tell the truth.
But they got away with it.
Is that the kind of lesson we want our young people learn-
ing from their high school administrators and coaches?
I think not."
Diadiun, "I don't know what we're supposed to do in this judicial system. Just tell your side
and the hell with the truth." Brief of Respondents at 6, Milkovich (No. 89-645).
54. Brief of Respondents at 5, Milkovich (No. 89-645).
55. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2698 (1990). The entire text of
Diadiun's article reads:
Yesterday in the Franklin County Common Pleas Court, judge Paul Martin
overturned an Ohio High School Athletic Assn. decision to suspend the Maple
Heights wrestling team from this year's state tournament.
It's not final yet - the judge granted Maple only a temporary injunction against
the ruling - but unless the judge acts much more quickly than he did in this decision
(he has been deliberating since a Nov. 8 hearing) the temporary injunction will allow
Maple to compete in the tournament and make any further discussion meaningless.
But there is something much more important involved here than whether Maple
was denied due process by the OHSAA, the basis of the temporary injunction.
When a person takes on a job in a school, whether it be as a teacher, coach,
administrator or even maintenance worker, it is well to remember that his primary
job is that of educator.
There is scarcely a person concerned with school who doesn't leave his mark in
some way on the young people who pass his way - many are the lessons taken away
from school by students which weren't learned from a lesson plan or out of a book.
They come from personal experiences with and observations of their superiors and
peers, from watching actions and reactions.
Such a lesson was learned (or relearned) yesterday by the student body of Maple
Heights High School, and by anyone who attended the Maple-Mentor wrestling meet
of last Feb. 8.
A lesson which, sadly, in view of the events of the past year, is well they learned
early.
It is simply this: If you get in a jam, lie your way out.
If you're successful enough, and powerful enough, and can sound sincere
enough, you stand an excellent chance of making the lie stand up, regardless of what
really happened.
The teachers responsible were mainly head wrestling coach Mike Milkovich and
former superintendent of schools H. Donald Scott.
Last winter they were faced with a difficult situation. Milkovich's ranting from
the side of the mat and egging the crowd on against the meet official and the oppos-
ing team backfired during a meet with Greater Cleveland Conference rival Metor
[sic], and resulted in first the Maple Heights team, then many of the partisan crowd
[Vol. 11
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On April 30, 1975, Milkovich brought a defamation action against
Lorain Journal Company, the News-Herald, and Diadiun.56 Milkovich
alleged that the headline of Diadiun's article and nine passages, including
those listed above, accused Milkovich of committing the crime of per-
jury.5 7 Milkovich also complained that the article had damaged him di-
rectly in his lifetime occupation of coach and teacher, and thus
constituted libel per se.58
attacking the Mentor squad in a brawl which sent four Mentor wrestlers to the hospi-
tal.
Naturally, when Mentor protested to the governing body of high school sports,
the OHSAA, the two men were called on the carpet to account for the incident.
But they declined to walk into the hearing and face up to their responsibilities,
as one would hope a coach of Milkovich's accomplishments and reputation would
do, and one would certainly expect from a man with the responsible poisition [sic] of
superintendent of schools.
Instead they chose to come to the hearing and misrepresent the things that hap-
pened to the OHSAA Board of Control, attempting not only to convince the board of
their own innocence, but, incredibly, shift the blame of the affair to Mentor.
I was among the 2,000-plus witnesses of the meet at which the trouble broke
out, and I also attended the hearing before the OHSAA, so I was in a unique position
of being the only non-involved party to observe both the meet itself and the
Milkovich-Scott version presented to the board.
Any resemblance between the two occurrances [sic] is purely coincidental.
To anyone who was at the meet, it need only be said that the Maple coach's wild
gestures during the events leading up to the brawl were passed off by the two as
"shrugs," and that Milkovich claimed he was "Powerless to control the crowd"
before the melee.
Fortunately, it seemed at the time, the Milkovich-Scott version of the incident
presented to the board of control had enough contradictions and obvious untruths so
that the six board members were able to see through it.
Probably as much in distasteful reaction to the chicanery of the two officials as
in displeasure over the actual incident, the board then voted to suspend Maple from
this year's tournament and to put Maple Heights, and both Milkovich and his son,
Mike Jr. (the Maple Jaycee coach), on two-year probation.
But unfortunately, by the time the hearing before Judge Martin rolled around,
Milkovich and Scott apparently had their version of the incident polished and recon-
structed, and the judge apparently believed them.
"I can say that some of the stories told to the judge sounded pretty darned
unfamiliar," said Dr. Harold Meyer, commissioner of the OHSAA, who attended the
hearing. "It certainly sounded different from what they told us."
Nevertheless, the judge bought their story, and ruled in their favor.
Anyone who attended the meet, whether he be from Maple Heights, Mentor, or
impartial observer, knows in his heart that Milkovich and Scott lied at the hearing
after each having given his solemn oath to tell the truth.
But they got away with it.
Is that the kind of lesson we want our young people learning from their high
school administrators and coaches?
I think not.
Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243 app. at 277-78, 496 N.E.2d 699 app. at 727-28
(1986).
56. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2699. See generally Brief of Respondents, Milkovich (No. 89-
645).
57. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2699.
58. Id. at 2699-700.
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B. Procedural History
1. Initial Proceedings and Remand
Milkovich filed his defamation action against the News-Herald and
its reporter in the Court of Common Pleas, Lake County, Ohio. 9 That
court entered a directed verdict against Milkovich on the ground that he
had failed to prove actual malice as required by New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan ("New York Times").' The Ohio Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Appellate District reversed and remanded, holding that there
was sufficient evidence of actual malice to go to the jury.6 The Ohio
Supreme Court dismissed the newspaper's appeal for lack of a substantial
constitutional question, and the United States Supreme Court denied Lo-
rain Journal's petition for writ of certiorari.62
On remand, the Court of Common Pleas entered summary judg-
ment for Lorain Journal Company, relying in part on Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc. ("Gertz"). 63 The trial court held that the Diadiun article
was an opinion protected from libel action by constitutional law," and
that Milkovich had failed to produce sufficient evidence to raise a genu-
ine issue of material fact with regard to actual malice.65 This time, the
court of appeals affirmed. 66 The Ohio Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the column was not constitutionally protected opinion. 67 Again, the
United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.6"
59. Id. at 2699.
60. Id. at 2700 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)).
61. Id. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 65 Ohio App. 2d 143, 416 N.E.2d 662
(1979).
62. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2700 (1990) (citing Lorain Journal
Co. v. Milkovich, 449 U.S. 966 (1980)). The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari
without a written opinion, and Justice Brennan dissented on the ground that the first amend-
ment protected Diadiun's article. Lorain Journal Co., 449 U.S. at 966. Justice Brennan wrote:
"This holding is clearly contrary to the First Amendment and to the relevant precedents of
this Court. I had supposed it was settled that newspapers are privileged to publish their views
of the facts, so long as those views are not recklessly or knowingly false. It matters not that
such views may conflict with those of a court, for the press is free to differ with judicial deter-
minations. In the libel area, neither a court nor any other institution is the 'recognized arbiter
of the truth,' as the court below asserted." Id. at 969 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
63. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2700 (1990) (citing Gertz, 418 U.S.
323 (1974)).
64. Id.
65. Brief of Respondents at 8, Milkovich (No. 89-645).
66. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2700.
67. Milkovich v. News Herald, 15 Ohio St. 3d 292, 473 N.E.2d 1191, 1196-97 (1984),
overruled, Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 496 N.E.2d 699 (1986).
68. Lorain Journal Co. v. Milkovich, 474 U.S. 953 (1985). Justice Brennan, joined by
Justice Marshall, dissented from the majority's denial of writ of certiorari. Justice Brennan
stated that Milkovich was both a public official and a public figure under the Supreme Court's
established precedent, and noted that both the trial court and the court of appeals had found
[Vol. I11
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2. Proceedings on Second Remand
On the second remand, the trial court stayed the proceedings pend-
ing the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Scott v. News-Herald
("Scott"),69 a related defamation suit involving the same claims, issues,
and column as those in the Milkovich case.7° The action was filed by the
superintendent of Maple Heights Public School, H. Don Scott, regarding
Diadiun's statement: "Anyone who attended the meet, whether he be
from Maple Heights, Mentor, or impartial observer, knows in his heart
that Milkovich and Scott lied at the hearing after each having given his
solemn oath to tell the truth."'" Both the trial and appellate courts had
ruled against Scott.72 In a reversal of its earlier position in the Milkovich
cases, the Ohio Supreme Court upheld a lower court's grant of summary
judgment against Scott, concluding that the column at issue was pro-
tected as opinion under the first amendment.73
The Ohio Court of Appeals considered itself bound by the Scott de-
cision and entered summary judgment for the newspaper and Diadiun.74
Following the outcome in Scott, the appellate court ruled that "it has
been decided, as a matter of law, that the article in question was constitu-
tionally protected opinion."' 75  The Ohio Supreme Court dismissed
Milkovich's appeal for want of a substantial constitutional question.76
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the Ohio
courts' recognition of a constitutionally required opinion exception to the
application of its defamation laws, 77 and reversed. 7' The Supreme Court
remanded to the Ohio Court of Appeals, because the Ohio Supreme
Court had previously dismissed the appeal.79
insufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that the column was published with actual malice.
Id. at 953, 957-62; Brief of Respondents at 8, Milkovich (No. 89-645).
69. 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 496 N.E.2d 699 (1986).
70. Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 243-44, 496 N.E.2d 699, 700-01 (1986).
71. Id. at 244, 251, 496 N.E.2d at 701, 706. Scott had attended the wrestling match in
February and testified with Milkovich at the hearings before OHSAA and the Court of Com-
mon Pleas. Id. at 243, 496 N.E.2d at 700.
72. Id. at 244, 496 N.E.2d at 701.
73. Id. at 254, 496 N.E.2d at 709.
74. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2701 (1990).
75. Milkovich v. News Herald, 46 Ohio App. 3d 20, 23, 545 N.E.2d 1320, 1324 (1989).
76. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2701; Milkovich v. News Herald, 43 Ohio St. 3d 707, 540
N.E.2d 724 (1989).
77. 110 S. Ct. at 2701.
78. Id.
79. Letter from Jacqueline M. Panza to W. Chelsea Chen (Oct. 22, 1990) (discussing De-
fendant-Appellees' motions and briefs in Milkovich v. The News-Herald). Jacqueline Panza is
a paralegal who works with her husband Richard D. Panza, a partner at Wickens, Herzer &
Panza, counsel for Lorain Journal Company.
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III. THE COURT'S REASONING
A. History of Defamation Law
1. Requirement of Actual Malice
Writing for the majority in Milkovich,8° Chief Justice William
Rehnquist began by tracing the development of English-American defa-
mation law."1 Beginning in the sixteenth century, common law afforded
a cause of action for damage to a person's reputation by the publication
of false and defamatory statements.82 The protection of one's reputation
and good name was considered so important that plaintiffs needed to
allege only an unprivileged publication of false and defamatory matters
in order to state a cause of action for defamation. 83 Defamation law al-
ways distinguished between the publication of defamatory statements of
fact and derogatory expressions of opinion." Both fact and opinion,
however, could be found actionable.85 An expression of opinion - even
if incapable of being proven or disproven - could be defamatory if it was
sufficiently derogatory so as to harm another's reputation. 6
Chief Justice Rehnquist then discussed the courts' developing con-
cerns that burdensome defamation laws could stifle valuable public de-
bate.87  To protect intuitive, evaluative statements that could not be
80. Justices White, Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy joined Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist's opinion. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695 (1990).
81. Defamation is comprised of the twin torts of libel and slander. Libel is generally in
written or printed form, while slander is usually oral. Libel was originally criminal, whereas
slander was not, because of the belief that defamation via the written word was more perma-
nent and thus constituted a greater wrong. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON
ON TORTS § 11, at 771, § 112, at 785-87 (5th ed. 1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 568 (1977).
In either form, defamation is "an invasion of the interest in reputation and good name."
W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra, at 771. Since it involves the opinion that others in the
community hold about the plaintiff, defamation requires that something be communicated to a
third person. Publication is the technical term given to this communication. W. PROSSER &
W. KEETON, supra, at 771, 797. A defamatory communication is one that tends to harm
another's reputation by lowering him in the estimation of the community or deterring third
persons from associating or dealing with him. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568
(1977). At common law, the individual's interest in the enjoyment and maintenance of a good
reputation was considered so socially significant that courts held a defendant who intentionally
published defamatory material to a standard of strict liability, without consideration of fault.
W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra, § 113, at 804.
82. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2702 (1990). Early courts sought to
allow individuals to vindicate their good name, and to afford them redress for harm caused by
such statements.
83. Id.
84. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 113A, at 813 (1984).
According to Prosser and Keeton, the distinction is an important one.
85. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2702.
86. Id. at 2702-03. See also R. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 6.02[l], at 6-4 (1990).
87. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2703 (1990).
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proven true or false, American courts gradually afforded limited protec-
tion to opinion through the recognition of a fair comment privilege.8"
This principle aimed to protect valuable interests in reputation, while
providing sufficient breathing space for vigorous public discourse and po-
tentially caustic free expression.89
In the 1960s, the Supreme Court placed the common law's fair com-
ment and opinion defenses on constitutional footing under the rubric of
the first amendment. 90  In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,9' the
Supreme Court held that the first amendment limited the application of
state defamation law.92 Under New York Times and Curtis Publishing
Co. v. Butts ("Butts"), 93 which followed three years later, public offi-
cials94 and public figures95 seeking damages for defamation had to prove
actual malice - knowledge that the statement was false or made with
reckless disregard of whether it was false - in order to recover.
96
In Gertz,97 the Supreme Court in dictum98 seemed to provide abso-
lute first amendment immunity from defamation actions for all opin-
ions.99 Additionally, the Court held that the first amendment did not
permit the imposition of liability, without a showing of fault, on a public
medium that published a defamatory statement concerning private indi-
viduals and private matters. "o The decision in Philadelphia Newspapers,
88. R. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 6.02[1], at 6-4 to 6-5 (1990). Over time, the fair
comment privilege encompassed opinions about matters of public concern based on true facts,
whether the opinion was "reasonable" or not. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 566 comment a (1977).
89. See 110 S. Ct. at 2703; R. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 6.01, at 6-4 (1990).
90. R. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 6.02[4][a], at 6-8 to 6-9, § 6.03[1], at 6-11
(1990). In New York Times, the Court constitutionalized the fair comment privilege, stating
that "[s]ince the Fourteenth Amendment requires recognition of the conditional privilege for
honest misstatements of fact, it follows that a defense of fair comment must be afforded for
honest expression of opinion based upon privileged, as well as true, statements of fact." Id. at
6-11 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 292 n.30 (1964)).
91. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
92. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 283.
93. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
94. New York Times, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964).
95. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (Warren, J., concurring).
96. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2703 (1990) (quoting New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964)).
97. Gertz, 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
98. The oft-quoted Gertz dictum reads: "Under the First Amendment there is no such
thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction
not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas. But there is
no constitutional value in false statements of fact." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,
339-40 (1974) (footnote omitted).
99. R. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 6.03[3], at 6-12 (1990).
100. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 113, at 807 (5th ed.
1984). If a private individual sought to recover punitive damages, however, the plaintiff had to
show actual malice. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350.
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Inc. v. Hepps ("Hepps")'0 imposed a further constitutional requirement
upon plaintiffs to bear the burden of showing falsity, as well as fault,
before recovering damages.1
0 2
2. Protection for Rhetorical Hyperbole
The Chief Justice then reviewed the Supreme Court's recognition of
constitutional immunity from liability for opinion involving statements
of rhetorical hyperbole under defamation law."13 In Greenbelt Coopera-
tive Publishing Association, Inc. v. Bresler ("Bresler"), " the Court deter-
mined that the printed term "blackmail," describing a real estate
developer's negotiating position, was constitutionally protected opin-
ion.'O5 The Court reasoned that the published reports were accurate and
full, and that even the most careless reader would have recognized that
the word was merely rhetorical hyperbole, or a "vigorous epithet" used
by those who deemed the developer's negotiating position highly unrea-
sonable."0 6 The context in which the words appeared dispelled any im-
pression that the developer had committed a crime.'0 7 Thus, no liability
may be imposed for language that is rhetorical, hyperbolic, and incapable
of being construed as actual fact.'0 8
For similar reasons, the Court in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell
("Falwell")' concluded that the first amendment precluded the plaintiff
from recovering for statements in a magazine parody, because the state-
ments could not reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts about
him. " 0 The parody portrayed Reverend Jerry Falwell as having engaged
in a drunken incestuous encounter with his mother in an outhouse."'
101. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
102. Id. at 776.
103. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2704-05 (1990). See also W. PROS-
SER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 111, at 776 (5th ed. 1984).
104. Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n, Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970). Bresler, the
plaintiff real estate developer, had engaged in negotiations with a local city council for zoning
variances on land he owned. Simultaneously, he was negotiating with the city in its attempt to
purchase other land from him. The concurrent negotiations gave both sides bargaining power.
A local newspaper accurately reported a public debate at a city council meeting, where some
people had denounced Bresler's negotiating demands as "blackmail." Id. at 6-7.
105. Bresler, 398 U.S. at 13-14.
106. Id. at 14.
107. R. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 6.03[2], at 6-12 (1990).
108. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2704-05 (1990); R. SMOLLA,
LAW OF DEFAMATION § 6.03[2], at 6-12 (1990).
109. 485 U.S. 46 (1988). In Falwell, Jerry Falwell, a nationally known minister and com-
mentator on politics and public affairs, was parodied in an advertisement published in Hustler,
a nationally circulated magazine. Id. at 47-48.
110. Falwell, 485 U.S. at 50.
111. Id. at 48. Specifically, the inside front cover of the November 1983 issue of Hustler
Magazine contained a parody of an advertisement for Campari Liqueur, entitled "Jerry
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Similarly, the Court in Old Dominion Branch No. 496, National As-
sociation of Letter Carriers v. Austin ("Letter Carriers")"H2 held that the
word "scab," used in a loose and figurative sense to describe non-union
employees, represented lusty and imaginative expression, and could not
sustain an action for defamation. 13 Reaffirming the dictum in Gertz, the
Court determined that such words were protected by the first amend-
ment because no reader would have understood the statement to be
charging the employees with a criminal offense." 4 For similar reasons,
epithets such as "stupid son of a bitch,""I I "bleached blond bastard,"" 6
"fucker," I17 and "nothing but a Lee Harvey Oswald and a Jack Ruby"" 8
are not actionable, no matter how offensive or vulgar.' 19
3. Standard of Review
Finally, the Milkovich Court turned to the standard of appellate re-
view required for libel actions. 12  In Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of
United States, Inc. ("Bose"), 12 1 the Court referred to the Gertz dictum
with approval, and held that appellate courts were required to make an
independent examination of the record. 2 2 The Court concluded that
this requirement would prevent abrogation of free expression.
23
Falwell talks about his first time." It was modeled after actual Campari ads that interviewed
celebrities about their "first times" - sampling the liqueur. In an alleged "interview," inter-
preting "first time" in a sexual sense, Falwell states that his "first time" was during a drunken
incestuous rendezvous with his mother in an outhouse. The parody portrayed Falwell and his
mother as drunk and immoral, and suggested that Falwell was a hypocrite who preached only
when he was drunk. In small print at the bottom of the page, the ad contained the disclaimer,
"ad parody - not to be taken seriously." Id.
112. 418 U.S. 264 (1974).
113. Id. at 285-86.
114. Id. at 284-86. See also R. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 6.03[4], at 6-14 to 6-15
(1990). In Letter Carriers, a union newsletter published the names of plaintiffs and other em-
ployees under the heading "List of Scabs," because they had not joined the union. Directly
above the list appeared a particularly derogatory passage, attributed to Jack London, defining
the term "scab." The following are excerpts from this passage: "After God had finished the
rattlesnake, the toad, and the vampire, He had some awful substance left with which He made
a scab. A scab is a two-legged animal with a corkscrew soul, a water brain, a combination
backbone of jelly and glue. Where others have hearts, he carries a tumor of rotten principles
.... A SCAB is a traitor to his God, his country, his family and his class." Letter Carriers,
418 U.S. at 267-68.
115. Moriarty v. Lippe, 162 Conn. 371, 294 A.2d 326, 333 (1972).
116. Notarmuzzi v. Shevack, 108 N.Y.S.2d 172, 174 (1951).
117. Spence v. Washington Post Co., 8 Med. L. Rep. (BNA) 2296 (D.C. Sup. Ct. 1982).
118. Stanley v. Taylor, 4 11. App. 3d 98, 278 N.E.2d 824, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 983 (1972).
119. R. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 6.12.[10], at 6-52 (1990).
120. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2705 (1990).
121. 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
122. Id. at 499.
123. Id.
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B. The Majority's Reasoning
1. No Wholesale Protection for Opinion
In explaining the Court's refusal to recognize first amendment pro-
tection for defamatory opinion as opposed to fact, Chief Justice Rehn-
quist declared that the Gertz dictum was not intended to create a
wholesale defamation exemption for all expressions of opinion.'24 In dic-
tum, the Gertz Court wrote: "Under the First Amendment there is no
such thing as a false idea." '25 According to Chief Justice Rehnquist,
such an interpretation ignored the fact that statements of opinion often
imply assertions of objective fact capable of being proven false.126 The
Milkovich Court held that simply couching statements in terms of opin-
ion did not dispel implications of a false assertion of fact.127
2. Balancing Reputation Against Free Speech
The Court's holding resulted from its balancing of the first amend-
ment's guarantee of "free and uninhibited discussion" of public issues,
and society's strong interest in preventing and redressing attacks on rep-
utation. 28 In New York Times,'29 the Court had held that erroneous
statements were inevitable in free debate, and that they had to be pro-
tected if freedoms of expression were to have the "breathing space" they
need to survive.130 The Milkovich Court concluded, however, that the
right to protection of one's reputation from unjustified invasion and
wrongful injury reflected the basic concept of every person's essential
dignity, and outweighed the interest in enlightened debate."' Further-
more, the Court found that the requisite breathing space was adequately
secured by existing constitutional doctrine without the creation of an
"artificial dichotomy between 'opinion' and fact."' 32
The Court then cited cases that, in its view, provided sufficient con-
stitutional safeguards for free speech and press.'3 3  For instance,
Hepps 134 required that statements on matters of public concern be prova-
124. Id. at 2705.
125. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974).
126. 110 S. Ct. at 2705.
127. Id. at 2705-06.
128. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2707 (1990) (quoting Rosenblatt v.
Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966)).
129. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
130. Id. at 271-72 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
131. 110 S. Ct. at 2708 (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92-93 (1966) (Stewart, J.,
concurring)).
132. Id. at 2706.
133. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2706-07 (1990).
134. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
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ble as false before media defendants can be liable under state defamation
law.' "35 The Bresler-Falwell-Letter Carriers line of cases provided protec-
tion for statements of rhetorical hyperbole that no reader could reason-
ably interpret as stating facts about an individual. '36 The Court reasoned
that the culpability requirements of the New York Times, Butts, and
Gertz cases further ensured that debate on public issues was "uninhib-
ited, robust, and wide-open." '137 The difficulty that plaintiffs had in
showing actual malice served as a barrier to recovery, and effectively lim-
ited the number of successful defamation actions.
38
Thus emerged the Court's new rule that, where a statement of opin-
ion on a matter of public concern reasonably implies false and defama-
tory facts about an individual, and the implication is sufficiently factual
to be susceptible to being proven true or false, the individual may recover
against the author or publisher of the opinion under defamation law. 1
39
3. Application of the Rule
Applying this standard to the facts of the Milkovich case, Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist addressed the question of whether a reasonable factfinder
could conclude that Diadiun's statements imply an assertion that
Milkovich perjured himself in a judicial proceeding. "4 When couched in
this way, the answer was quite clear.'' The Court simply held that the
statements were not rhetorical hyperbole, which would negate a reader's
impression that Diadiun seriously believed Milkovich had committed
perjury. '42 Second, the majority found that the general tenor of the arti-
cle did not dispel the impression that Diadiun was serious in his
allegation. 1
43
Next, the Court briefly turned to whether Diadiun's implication that
135. 110 S. Ct. at 2706.
136. Id.
137. Id. (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
138. Note, The Art of Insinuation: Defamation by Implication, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 677
(1990); Goodale, 'Milkovich: A Modest Loss for the Press, N.Y. L.J., June 27, 1990, at 2, col. 4.
According to one commentator, however, the actual malice requirement could become an all-
too-easy barrier for a public figure plaintiff to overcome, in light of the intense scrutiny of press
newsgathering activities that the Supreme Court has recently engaged in. See Gross, Opinions
Left Unprotected by Supreme Court Ruling, Pa. L.J.-Reporter, Aug. 6, 1990, at 8, col. 5 (refer-
ring to Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657 (1989), in which the
Supreme Court sustained a $200,000 jury award against an Ohio newspaper for failing to in-
clude relevant information in a political story).
139. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2706-07 (1990).
140. Id. at 2707.
141. Clayton, High Court: No Federal Privilege for 'Opinion'Found Defamatory, Nat'l L.J.,
Aug. 27, 1990, at 27, col. 4.
142. 110 S. Ct. at 2707.
143. Id.
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Milkovich had committed perjury was verifiable. 1" The majority found
that the connotation that Milkovich had committed perjury was suffi-
ciently factual and thus capable of being proven true or false. 45 The
majority noted that a comparison of Milkovich's testimony before the
OHSAA and court hearings would determine if Milkovich had lied.146
The comparison could utilize objective evidence in the form of tran-
scripts and witnesses present at the hearing. 47 Since Diadiun's state-
ments could be verified, the Court concluded they were not subjective
assertions. 148 Instead, they were articulations of an objectively verifiable
event, 49 and once proven false, permitted the imposition of liability. 5 '
Thus, the Court focused more closely on the facts that a reader
might infer from a challenged statement, and the precise words used,
rather than its overall context. 5 Instead of distinguishing between fact
and opinion, the majority shifted the primary inquiry to whether a reader
could infer a factual allegation, capable of being proven false, from the
opinion. 52 This query easily transforms a formerly protected opinion
into a potentially actionable statement. 5 3 Further, the majority's ap-
proach widens the perimeters of an unprotected category, instead of con-
fining them within narrower limits to ensure that protected expression
will not be inhibited. 
1 54
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Protected Opinion
Courts and libel experts have defined opinion in many ways. One
scholar describes opinion as "an inference from facts [that] can be more
or less accurate but not true or false."' 55 Thus, expressions of opinion
are distinguishable from communications of fact, where truth and falsity
144. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2707 (1990).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. (quoting Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 252, 496 N.E.2d 699, 707).
149. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2707 (1990).
150. See 110 S. Ct. at 2707.
151. Clayton, High Court: No Federal Privilege for 'Opinion' Found Defamatory, Nat'l L.J.,
Aug. 27, 1990, at 27, col. 1.
152. See Warren, Heinke & Sager, Not as Bad as It Looks, Nat'l L.J., July 30, 1990, at 13,
col. 2.
153. See generally Clayton, High Court: No Federal Privilege for 'Opinion'Found Defama-
tory, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 27, 1990, at 28, col. 1.
154. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2709 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(quoting Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 505 (1984)).
155. Schneider, A Model for Relating Defamatory "Opinions" to First Amendment Protected
"Ideas," 43 ARK. L. REv. 57, 64-65 (1990).
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matter greatly. 15 6 Truthful statements of fact are never actionable under
defamation law,' 57 but false statements of fact have negligible social
value and receive no constitutional protection.' 58 By contrast, the ac-
tionability of opinions cannot be determined by reference to their falsity
or truth. 5 9 Instead, as this note suggests, courts should examine the
broader social context of an opinion in order to assess its societal and
constitutional value.e °
Over the years, the common law has recognized and protected from
defamation liability three kinds of opinion. 16' The first is quasi-opinion,
which comprises statements of rhetorical hyperbole, ambiguity, and sat-
ire.' 6 2 These include comments such as those at issue in the Bresler-
Falwell-Letter Carriers line of cases.'
63
The second type of protected opinion is a conclusion drawn in the
communicator's mind from factual information, and often shielded by
the defense of factual truth." 4 These comprise both conclusions "based
more upon personal taste than a measurable assertion based upon specific
facts," 65 and statements "not of purely personal taste... relat[ing] to an
objective set of standards that can be supported by specific facts."'1 6 6 Ex-
amples of personal conclusions are "statements . . . [regarding] [w]hat
ought to be done, the propriety or aesthetic or moral worth of an act or
object."' 167 Examples of objective opinions are communications indicat-
ing that a restaurant's food is unwholesome, or that a historical writing is
156. Id. at 64.
157. See id. at 64 n.20.
158. See id. at 64.
159. See Jamerson v. Anderson Newspapers, Inc., 469 N.E.2d 1243, 1252 (Ind. Ct. App.
1984) (citing Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1976)); Marchiondo v. New Mexico
State Tribune Co., 98 N.M. 282, 648 P.2d 321, 330 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982).
The Milkovich rule conflicts with this theory because it bases defamation liability on the
implication of false fact. Chief Justice Rehnquist held that statements of opinion that imply
assertions of objective fact, capable of being provenfalse, are actionable. See supra text accom-
panying notes 126-27, 139.
160. See infra text accompanying notes 362-88 (discussing fourth Ollman factor as test for
protected opinion).
161. Schneider, A Model for Relating Defamatory "Opinions" to First Amendment Protected
"Ideas," 43 ARK. L. REV. 57, 70-71 (1990).
162. Id. at 72.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 103-19 (Bresler-Falwell-Letter Carriers line of
cases).
164. Schneider, A Modelfor Relating Defamatory "Opinions" to First Amendment Protected
"Ideas," 43 ARK. L. REV. 57, 86-87 (1990).
165. Id. at 90.
166. Id.
167. Marchiondo v. New Mexico State Tribune Co., 98 N.M. 282, 648 P.2d 321, 330 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1982) (quoting R. SACK, LIBEL, SLANDER AND RELATED PROBLEMS § IV.2, at 155-
56 (1980)).
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inadequately supported by research. 6 '
A third form of opinion has received protection from defamation
liability under the common law privilege of fair comment. 169 Recogniz-
ing the overriding social value of discussion of important issues, courts
have protected opinions derived from statements of fact.' 7 ° These in-
clude opinions made in political debates and those that criticize govern-
ment officials.' 7 ' Due to inherent confusions and limitations in these
analyses, one expert has concluded that common law analysis is inade-
quate by itself to protect communications of high societal value.' 72
Recently, lower courts had sheltered newspapers from defamation
liability by protecting opinion as distinguished from fact.' 7 3 If a pub-
lished statement were found to be solely an expression of the writer's
opinion, rather than an affirmation of verifiable fact, then the statement
was protected by the first amendment's guarantee of free speech and
press. 174 The Milkovich decision eliminated this absolute privilege for all
opinion, and adopted an approach not based on a fact-opinion distinc-
tion. '75 Under the new standard, a published statement is actionable,
even if expressed as an opinion, if it is found to reasonably imply false
and defamatory facts about its subject.'
76
B. The Court's Cowardly Opinion
The majority and dissenting opinions in Milkovich agreed that no
separate or additional constitutional protection existed for an entire cate-
gory of statements characterized as opinion rather than fact. 177 In the
dissent's words, the Court "dispels any misimpression that there is a so-
called opinion privilege wholly in addition to the protections" already
guaranteed by the first amendment. 78 The Court determined that pro-
tection for statements of pure opinion is dictated by "existing [flirst
168. Schneider, A Model for Relating Defamatory "Opinions" to First Amendment Protected
"Ideas," 43 ARK. L. REV. 57, 90 (1990).
169. Id. at 91.
170. Id. at 91-92.
171. Id. at 91.
172. Id. at 94.
173. Relying principally on Gertz, 418 U.S. 323 (1974), the courts in every federal circuit
and at least 36 states have held expressions of opinion to be protected under the first amend-
ment. Brief of Respondents at 21-22, Milkovich (No. 89-645).
174. Id. at 21-22 nn.8-9.
175. See Warren, Heinke & Sager, Not as Bad as It Looks, Nat'l L.J., July 30, 1990, at 13,
col. 2 (stating that the Supreme Court's focus in determining the actionability of a published
opinion is on an element of the plaintiff's prima facie case - whether there is a false statement
of fact - rather than on the more metaphysical concept of whether a statement is an opinion).
176. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2706-07 (1990).
177. 110 S. Ct. at 2707-08; id. at 2708 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 2708 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (original emphasis).
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[a]mendment doctrine."'' 79
The Court's holding in Milkovich conflicts with numerous lower
court decisions. 8° Over the last sixteen years, courts in every federal
circuit and at least thirty-six states have held expressions of opinion to be
protected under the first amendment.' 8 ' For example, the Second Cir-
179. Id. (original emphasis).
180. Levine, Fear and Libel in the Newsroom, Tex. Law., Aug. 13, 1990, at 22 (stating that
editorial writers have "decried the apparent abandonment of fifteen years of precedent").
181. Brief of Respondents at 21-22, Milkovich (No. 89-645); Comment, Statements of Fact,
Statements of Opinion, and the First Amendment, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1001, 1009 n.52 (1986).
See, e.g., Fudge v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 840 F.2d 1012, (1st Cir. 1988) (concluding that the
headline "Little Amazons Attack Boys" to describe eight- to twelve-year-old girls was consti-
tutionally protected opinion, and could not possibly be false), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 82 (1988);
Church of Scientology of California v. Cazares, 638 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that
statements describing a church as a "rip-off, money motivated operation" and its religious
faith as "anti-Christ and Satanic," when read in their proper context, constituted mere opin-
ions and were therefore non-actionable; Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 883 (1986) (finding that any implication in a magazine article that re-
venge motivated plaintiff governor's prosecution of a felon was opinion and thus absolutely
protected under the first amendment); Lewis v. Time, Inc., 710 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1983) (con-
cluding that the negative inference of "shadier practitioners" to describe a lawyer was pro-
tected as an expression of opinion based on true statements of fact); Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d
970, 978 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985) (see infra note 196);
Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican-American, Inc., 188 Conn. 107, 448 A.2d 1317 (1982)
(holding that a reporter's descriptions of a developer's poor construction work as a "sore spot"
and "ghost town" were pure expressions of opinion, since a reasonable person could only view
them as such, and therefore they were unqualifiedly protected by the first amendment under
Gertz); Caron v. Bangor Publishing Co., 470 A.2d 782, 784 (Me. 1984) (finding that an edito-
rial on the subject of "fat cops," stating that plaintiff policeman "carries too much mass to be
... an effective cop" would not reasonably be construed to imply undisclosed defamatory facts,
and was thus a constitutionally protected expression of opinion based on disclosed nondefama-
tory facts), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1241 (1984); Henry v. Halliburton, 690 S.W.2d 775 (Mo.
1985) (en banc) (concluding that, when considered under the totality of the circumstances, the
words "fraud" and "twister" to describe insurance agents were expressions of opinion, and not
actionable). See also Avins v. White, 627 F.2d 637, 642 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 982
(1980); Orr v. Argus-Press Co., 586 F.2d 1108, 1114 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 960
(1979); Biggs v. Village of Dupo, 892 F.2d 1298 (7th Cir. 1990); Koch v. Goldway, 817 F.2d
507, 508 (9th Cir. 1987); Rinsley v. Brandt, 700 F.2d 1304, 1307 (10th Cir. 1983); Keller v.
Miami Herald Publishing Co., 778 F.2d 711 (1 th Cir. 1985); Moffat v. Brown, 751 P.2d 939,
944 (Alaska 1988); MacConnell v. Mitten, 131 Ariz. 22, 638 P.2d 689 (1981); Bland v. Verser,
299 Ark. 490, 774 S.W.2d 124, 125-26 (1989); Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 17 Cal.
3d 596, 601, 552 P.2d 425, 427, 131 Cal. Rptr. 641, 643 (1976); Burns v. McGraw-Hill Broad-
casting Co., 659 P.2d 1351, 1358 (Colo. 1983); Bucher v. Roberts, 198 Colo. 1, 3-5, 595 P.2d
239, 241-42 (1979); Riley v. Moyed, 529 A.2d 248 (Del. 1987); Scandinavian World Cruises
(Bahamas) Ltd. v. Ergle, 525 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Lampkin-Asam v. Miami
Daily News, Inc., 408 So. 2d 666, 667 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981), review denied, 417 So. 2d 329
(Fla.), dismissing appeal from, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 806 (1982); Catalano v. Pechous, 83 Ill.
2d 146, 159, 419 N.E.2d 350, 356-57 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981);
Mittelman v. Witous, 135 Ill. 2d 220, 552 N.E.2d 973 (Ill. 1988); Jamerson v. Anderson News-
papers, Inc., 469 N.E.2d 1243, 1252 (Ind. App. 1984); Jones v. Palmer Communications, Inc.,
440 N.W.2d 884 (Iowa 1989); Yancey v. Hamilton, 786 S.W.2d 854 (Ky. 1989); Mashburn v.
Collin, 355 So. 2d 879, 884-85 (La. 1977); Bussie v. Lowenthal, 535 So. 2d 378, 380-81 (La.
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cuit held in Mr. Chow of New York v. Ste. Jour Azur, S.A. 182 that expres-
sions of opinion clearly were constitutionally protected." 3 Similarly, the
Ohio Supreme Court in Scott v. News-Herald ' 8 4 declared that expres-
sions of opinion are generally granted absolute immunity from defama-
tion liability under the first amendment."' 5 In Steinhilber v. Alphonse, 186
the New York Court of Appeals held that it was a settled rule that ex-
pressions of opinion, "false or not, libelous or not, are constitutionally
protected and may not be the subject of private damage actions." 187
For similar reasons, the California Supreme Court in Baker v. Los
Angeles Herald Examiner "I" protected statements published in a review
of a television show as expressions of opinion rather than fact. '8 9 In Carr
v. Warden, 9 0 the California Court of Appeal found that an allegedly de-
famatory statement made by a city councilmember was an expression of
opinion rather than fact, and thus non-actionable. 191
1988); True v. Ladner, 513 A.2d 257, 261-62 (Me. 1986); Hearst Corp. v. Hughes, 297 Md.
112, 466 A.2d 486 (1983); Aldoupolis v. Globe Newspaper Co., 398 Mass. 731, 500 N.E.2d
794, 796 (1986); Myers v. Boston Magazine, 380 Mass. 336, 403 N.E.2d 376, 377-78 (1980);
Gernander v. Winona State Univ., 428 N.W.2d 473, 475 (Minn. App. 1988); Johnson v. Delta-
Democrat Publishing Co., 531 So. 2d 811 (Miss. 1988); Frigon v. Morrison-Maierle, Inc., 233
Mont. 113, 760 P.2d 57 (1988); Turner v. Welliver, 226 Neb. 275, 411 N.W.2d 298, 309-10
(1987); Nevada Indep. Broadcasting Corp. v. Allen, 99 Nev. 404, 664 P.2d 337 (1983); Nash v.
Keene Publishing Corp., 127 N.H. 214, 498 A.2d 348, 351 (1985); Pease v. Telegraph Publish-
ing Co., 121 N.H. 62, 65, 426 A.2d 463, 465-66 (1981); Kotlikoff v. Community News, 89 N.J.
62, 65, 444 A.2d 1086, 1087, 1089-90 (1982); Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel Publishing Co., 104
N.J. 125, 516 A.2d 220, 231 (1986); Saenz v. Morris, 106 N.M. 530, 746 P.2d 159 (1987);
Marchiondo v. New Mexico State Tribune Co., 98 N.M. 282, 291, 648 P.2d 321, 330 (1981),
cert. quashed, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794 (1982); Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc.,
42 N.Y.2d 369, 380, 366 N.E.2d 1299, 1306, 397 N.Y.S.2d 943, 950 (1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 969 (1977); Steinhilber v. Alphonse, 68 N.Y.2d 283, 501 N.E.2d 550, 508 N.Y.S.2d 901
(1986); Renwick v. News and Observer Publishing Co., 63 N.C. App. 200, 304 S.E.2d 593, 604
(1983), rev'd on other grounds, 310 N.C. 312, 312 S.E.2d 405 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 858
(1984); Miskovsky v. Oklahoma Publishing Co., 654 P.2d 587, 593 (Okla. 1982), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 923 (1982), reh'g denied, 459 U.S. 1059 (1982); Baker v. Lafayette College, 516 Pa.
291, 532 A.2d 399 (1987); Healey v. New England Newspapers, Inc., 520 A.2d 147, 150-51
(R.I. 1987); Carroll v. Times Printing Co., 14 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1210 (Tenn. 1987);
Leader v. WSM, Inc., 10 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1343 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. 1984); Casso v. Brand,
776 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. 1989); Havalunch, Inc. v. Mazza, 294 S.E.2d 70, 75 (W. Va. 1981).
182. 759 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1985).
183. Id.
184. 496 N.E.2d 699 (Ohio 1986).
185. Id. at 705.
186. 68 N.Y.2d 283, 501 N.E.2d 550 (N.Y. 1986).
187. Steinhilber, 68 N.Y.2d at 286, 501 N.E.2d at 550 (quoting Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart &
Winston, 42 N.Y.2d 369, 380, 397 N.Y.S.2d 943, 366 N.E.2d 1299 (1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 969 (1977)).
188. 42 Cal. 3d 254, 228 Cal. Rptr. 206, 721 P.2d 87 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1032
(1987).
189. Id. at 259, 269, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 208, 215, 720 P.2d 89, 96-97.
190. 159 Cal. App. 3d 1166, 206 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1984).
191. Id. at 1169, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 163.
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In denying the existence of a separate constitutional exemption from
libel actions for opinion, the Milkovich Court cowered behind existing
constitutional doctrine, instead of forging a needed area of constitutional
protection for newspapers and their writers.' 92 Choosing to disagree
with the vast majority of courts in the United States, the Milkovich Court
shied away from construing the Constitution to provide broader first
amendment protection to newspapers beleaguered by libel and defama-
tion lawsuits.' 93 In explanation, the Court gave weak policy reasons for
its refusal to recognize this additional shield. It based its holding on four
words: "mistaken reliance on ... dictum."' 94
According to the Court, the opinion exception to defamation law
was the result of mistaken reliance by lower courts on dictum of the
Gertz case.' 9 ' Writing for the Gertz majority, Justice Powell stated:
Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false
idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for
its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on
the competition of other ideas.' 96
The Milkovich Court equated the word "opinion" in the second sentence
with the term "idea" in the first sentence, claiming that the language
merely reiterates Justice Holmes' classic "marketplace of ideas" con-
cept. 197 The Court asserted that an interpretation of the Gertz dictum
that created a wholesale exemption in defamation law for anything la-
beled opinion would contradict the tenor and context of the passage, and
also ignore the fact that expressions of opinion may often imply an asser-
192. Concededly, the facts of the Milkovich case - involving an accusation that the plaintiff
had lied under oath - were particularly weak ones upon which to raise an opinion defense.
Levine, Fear and Libel in the Newsroom, Tex. Law., Aug. 13, 1990, at 22.
193. According to libel experts, the United States is experiencing a great proliferation of
highly publicized libel actions brought against media defendants - including newspapers -
by well-known figures seeking enormous awards of money. Elected officials, public interest
advocates, entertainers, corporate presidents, and private individuals have all contributed to
the recent increase in the number of libel suits. In the words of a prominent media lawyer,
"[w]hat we're seeing is an entirely new era in libel cases." Defendants range from national
news conglomerates to local news outlets to the more sensational tabloids. Smolla, Let the
A uthor Beware: The Rejuvenation of the American Law of Libel, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1 & n.2, 3,
5 n.26 (1983). See infra note 409 (list of recent libel claims).
194. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2706 (1990). See Clayton, High
Court: No Federal Privilege for 'Opinion' Found Defamatory, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 27, 1990, at 27,
col. 1.
195. 110 S. Ct. at 2705-06.
196. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339-40.
197. 110 S. Ct. at 2705 (citing Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes,
J., dissenting)). Discussing the "marketplace of ideas" concept in his dissent, Holmes opined
that "the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas .... [T]he best test of
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market."
Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630.
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tion of objective fact capable of being proven false.' 98
Reading the Gertz passage to equate the words opinion and idea in
the second sentence, however, could support an interpretation that the
Court meant to protect all expressions of opinion, no matter how perni-
cious. 199 According to one scholar, "opinion can serve as a synonym [for
ideas]. Indeed Justice Powell used the word 'opinion' interchangeably
with the word 'idea.'"200 One dictionary defines the word "idea" as a
"formulated thought or opinion."2°1 If the two terms are considered
synonomous, then the first sentence can be interpreted to mean that the
Constitution recognizes no opinion as false or actionable. Taken to-
gether, the first and second sentences could imply that "false" opinions
are not actionable because they will be corrected by competing opinions
in the "marketplace" of ideas.202 Thus, all opinions would enjoy an ab-
solute constitutional privilege.
This broad interpretation is limited, however, by contextual consid-
erations.2°3 In context, the Gertz dictum asserts that ideas are considered
of such value that they may need constitutional protection.2° Where
opinions constitute subjectively held views of these valued ideas, they
would receive first amendment protection under Gertz if inadequately
protected.20 5 Not all communications are of equal value, however; thus,
some are not entitled to the same protection as others under the Consti-
tution.2 6 Historical evidence fails to indicate that the Constitution was
intended to protect opinions without reference to their social impor-
tance.207 This note advocates that expressions of opinion, when socially
valuable in context, require constitutional protection.
This proposed contextual approach derives partly from the Gertz
dictum. Justice Powell based his proposition in Gertz on a concept that
Thomas Jefferson enunciated in his first inaugural speech: "If there be
any among us who would wish to dissolve this Union or change its re-
publican form, let them stand undisturbed as monuments of the safety
198. 110 S. Ct. at 2705.
199. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339-40 (dictum); Olman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 975-76 (1984).
200. Schneider, A Model for Relating Defamatory "Opinions" to First Amendment Protected
"Ideas," 43 ARK. L. REV. 57, 65 (1990). In another portion of his address, Jefferson spoke of
a "contest of opinion" in referring to the conflict between the philosophical ideas of the Feder-
alists and the Republicans during the 1800 presidential election. Id. at 65-66 (emphasis
added).
201. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 597 (9th ed. 1987) (emphasis added).
202. Ollman, 750 F.2d 970 at 975-76.
203. Schneider, A Model for Relating Defamatory "Opinions" to First Amendment Protected
"Ideas," 43 ARK. L. REv. 57, 68-69 (1990).
204. Id. at 69.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 64.
207. Id. at 68-69.
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with which error of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to
combat it."2°8 Jefferson wished to preserve the battle of important ideas,
or opinion in a non-trivial context. 2"
Although Powell's proposition was dictum2" in Gertz, the
Milkovich Court should have elevated to constitutional principle the dis-
tinction between false fact and socially valuable opinion, and should have
held that the first amendment protected those expressions of opinion. If
it had done so, the Court would have constitutionalized a systematic ap-
proach adopted by a large majority of lower courts that had brought
order to defamation law.2 ' The Milkovich holding may restore disorder
to an area of law that had become orderly and predictable.2" 2
Furthermore, Chief Justice Rehnquist had stated in his Falwell
opinion 213 that a core first amendment value is the recognition of the
fundamental importance of the free flow of ideas and opinions on matters
of public interest and concern.21 4 Justice Rehnquist had also noted that
the freedom to speak one's mind is not only an aspect of individual lib-
erty - and thus a good in itself - but also is essential to the common
quest for truth and the vitality of society as a whole. 21 5 Therefore, Jus-
tice Rehnquist's declared interest in ensuring the free exchange of ideas
and opinions weakens the force of the majority's holding in Milkovich.
C. The Majority Court's Erroneous Conclusion
1. The Four-Part Test in Olman
Leaving aside the Court's disappointing failure to sanction constitu-
tional protection for statements deemed to be opinion, the Court errone-
208. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339, 340 & n.8 (emphasis added).
209. Schneider, A Model for Relating Defamatory "Opinions" to First Amendment Protected
"Ideas," 43 ARK. L. REV. 57, 66 (1990).
210. Goodale, 'Milkovich. A Modest Loss for the Press, N.Y. L.J., June 27, 1990, at 2, col. 4;
Clayton, High Court: No Federal Privilege for 'Opinion' Found Defamatory, Nat'l L.J., Aug.
27, 1990, at 27, col. 1.
211. Greenhouse, High Court Narrows Shield in Libel Law, N.Y. Times, June 22, 1990, at
A 17, col. 6 (comments of Bruce W. Sanford, a media lawyer representing the Scripps-Howard
newspaper chain and the Society of Professional Journalists).
212. Id. See also Note, Protection of Reputation Versus Freedom of Expression: Striking a
Manageable Compromise in the Tort of Defamation, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 435, 436 (1990) (stat-
ing that, following the decision in New York Times, the Supreme Court paved a tortuous
course of decisions in attempting to apply first amendment principles to the law of defamation,
and created a complex set of vaguely defined categories, which commentators have fiercely
criticized over the years); Smolla, Let the Author Beware: The Rejuvenation of the American
Law of Libel, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 14 (1983) (referring to the confusion in the law of
defamation).
213. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
214. Id. at 50.
215. Id. at 50-51 (quoting Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 503-04 (1984)).
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ously analyzed the facts in the Milkovich case. The majority should have
concluded, as the dissent did,2" 6 that no reasonable reader could have
found that Diadiun's opinions implicated false and defamatory assertions
of fact about Milkovich.21 7 Under the majority's rule, Diadiun's state-
ments implying that Milkovich had lied were patently conjecture.21  As
such, they necessarily fell into the Bresler-Falwell-Letter Carriers219 cate-
gory of rhetorical hyperbole, and were entitled to full constitutional
protection.22 °
In its analysis, the majority declined to embrace Olman v. Evans,
22'
an influential222 District of Columbia Circuit court case that the
Milkovich dissent cited with approval. 223 The Olman court determined
the actionability of a statement based on its context and a resulting dis-
tinction between fact and opinion. 224 For more than a decade, a majority
of lower courts have employed the indicia set forth in Olman to distin-
guish between statements of defamatory fact and constitutionally pro-
tected opinion as a matter of law.225
216. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2708 (1990). Justice William Bren-
nan dissented, joined by Justice Thurgood Marshall. Id.
217. 110 S. Ct. at 2709 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
218. Id. at 2710.
219. See supra text accompanying notes 103-19 (regarding Bresler-Falwell-Letter Carriers
line of cases).
220. 110 S. Ct. at 2709 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See Goodale, 'Milkovich': A Modest Loss
for the Press, N.Y. L.J., June 27, 1990, at 1, col. 2 to 2, col. 3.
221. Olman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985). In
Oilman, the plaintiff, a professor of political science, was characterized by statements in a
syndicated newspaper column as an "outspoken proponent of political Marxism" with "no
status within the profession," and a "pure and simple activist." Id. at 972-73. In a 6-5 vote
that included seven separate opinions, the court held that all of the allegedly defamatory state-
ments made by the columnists were absolutely privileged as opinion. Id at 971.
222. See R. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 6.0813][a], at 6-28 (1990).
223. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2709 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing). Under the Oilman test, if a statement was found to be opinion, it received absolute
constitutional protection. Oilman, 750 F.2d at 971.
Despite the differing views of context in the majority and dissenting opinions of
Milkovich, the dissent characterized the majority's overall approach as consistent with the
Oilman test. Clayton, High Court: No Federal Privilege for 'Opinion' Found Defamatory, Nat'l
L.J., Aug. 27, 1990, at 28, col. 1. In addition to its inquiry of how readers would have reason-
ably interpreted Diadiun's statements, the majority addressed only the first two Oilman factors
- the statement's actual meaning and its verifiability. See Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2707;
Immuno A.G. v. Moor-Jankowski, 18 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1625 (1991); supra text accompa-
nying notes 140-50.
224. Oilman, 750 F.2d at 978-79. On the other hand, the Milkovich Court indicated, but
did not specifically hold, that the fact-opinion distinction is a question of fact, rather than law.
Clayton, High Court: No Federal Privilege for 'Opinion' Found Defamatory, Nat'l L.J., Aug.
27, 1990, at 27, col. 1.
225. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal, 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2709 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(citing Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Potomac Valve & Fitting Inc. v.
Crawford Fitting Co., 829 F.2d 1280 (4th Cir. 1987); Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d
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In Oilman, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, sit-
ting en banc, elaborated on a "totality of circumstances" approach,226
under which an allegedly defamatory statement is examined in its totality
in the context in which it was published. 227 The court identified four
factors to be used in determining whether a statement is an expression of
opinion, and thus non-actionable: (1) common usage or meaning of the
specific language used; (2) verifiability; (3) immediate context in which
the statement occurs, including content and cautionary language; and
(4) the broader social context or setting in which the statement ap-
pears.22" The fourth factor - broader social context - is arguably the
most important of the four.229 As will be discussed later, it favors lenient
judicial treatment of statements of opinion found in certain contexts.230
The first factor analyzes the common usage or meaning of the alleg-
1300 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 883 (1986). See also cases cited supra note 181
(decisions holding opinion constitutionally protected); supra text accompanying notes 182-91.
226. Judge Starr's opinion for the court, and the concurring opinions of Judges Bork and
MacKinnon, all emphasized flexible totality of circumstances approaches. Judge Starr's opin-
ion argued that, to evaluate the totality of the circumstances, four factors should be assessed.
Oilman, 750 F.2d at 979, 997 (Bork, J., concurring), 1016 (MacKinnon, J., concurring); R.
SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 6.08[3][c], at 6-30 (1990).
Prior to the decision in Oilman, some courts had employed a three-prong totality of the
circumstances approach for distinguishing between fact and opinion, derived from the Ninth
Circuit's holding in Information Control Corp. v. Genesis One Computer Corp., 611 F.2d 781,
784 (9th Cir. 1980). The three factors to be analyzed are: (1) whether the statement can be
understood in a defamatory sense based on the facts surrounding the publication, not just the
words alone; (2) whether the statements were made in public debate, heated labor disputes, or
other circumstances in which an audience may anticipate efforts by the parties to persuade
others to their positions by use of epithets, fiery rhetoric or hyperbole; and (3) whether the
language of the statements is cautiously phrased in terms of apparency or is of a kind typically
generated in a spirited legal dispute in which judgment, loyalties and subjective motives of the
parties are reciprocally attacked and defended in the media and other public forums. Informa-
tion Control, 611 F.2d at 783-84. See also Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 17 Cal. 3d
596, 601, 131 Cal. Rptr. 641, 644, 552 P.2d 425, 428 (1976); Cole v. Westinghouse Broadcast-
ing Co., 386 Mass. 303, 435 N.E.2d 1021 (Mass.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1037 (1982); Burns v.
McGraw-Hill Broadcasting Co., 659 P.2d 1351, 1360 (Colo. 1983); From v. Tallahassee Dem-
ocrat, Inc., 400 So. 2d 52, 57 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
An alternate theory for analyzing the opinion privilege is found in the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts. See infra text accompanying notes 294-304.
227. R. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 6.0811], at 6-26 to 6-27 (1990). Under the total-
ity of circumstances methodology, a court had to consider all the words used (not merely a
particular phrase or sentence), cautionary terms that accompanied the statement, and all other
circumstances surrounding the statement, including the medium used and the audience. Id.
(citing Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Cole v. Westinghouse Broadcasting
Co., 386 Mass. 303, 435 N.E.2d 1021, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1037 (1982); Information Control
Corp. v. Genesis One Computer Corp., 611 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1980)).
228. Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 979-84 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
229. Note, Fact and Opinion in Defamation: Recognizing the Formative Power of Context, 58
FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 762 (1990).
230. See infra text accompanying notes 362-88 (fourth Oilman factor as proposed test).
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edly defamatory words themselves. 231  The object is to determine
whether the statement has a consistent, precise meaning and is thus likely
to give rise to a clear factual implication.232 According to the Olman
court, readers are considerably less likely to infer facts from an indefinite
or ambiguous statement than from one with a commonly understood
meaning.233 Therefore, statements that can be interpreted or defined in
various ways cannot support a defamation action.234 Opinions labelling
a political writer as a "fascist" 235 or a judge as "incompetent," for exam-
ple, use words too vague and imprecise to give rise to a generally ac-
cepted core of meaning, and are thus inactionable.
236
If the words convey a widely accepted meaning, however, the court
looks to the provability of the statement. 237 This inquiry is the second
factor of the Ollman test, analyzing verifiability - the extent to which
the statement is capable of being proven or disproven objectively.238 The
reason for this inquiry is simply that a reader cannot rationally view an
unverifiable statement as conveying actual facts.2 39 The statement may
231. Oilman, 750 F.2d at 979-80. See also R. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION
§ 6.08[3][c][i], at 6-30 (1990). This factor has been referred to as the linguistic side of ver-
ifiability. Comment, Statements of Fact, Statements of Opinion, and the First Amendment, 74
CALIF. L. REV. 1001, 1019 (1986).
232. Oilman, 750 F.2d at 980; R. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 6.08[3][c][i], at 6-30
(1990). A classic example of a statement with a well-defined meaning is an accusation of a
crime. Although the charge depends on normative social values, these standards are so com-
monly understood that reasonable readers may imply extremely damaging facts.
233. Olman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
234. Id. (citing Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882, 895 (2d Cir. 1976)).
235. In Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1976), the Second Circuit found that the
use of "fascist" as a political label could not be regarded as having been proven to be a state-
ment of fact, due to the great imprecision of the term's meaning and usage in political debate.
236. R. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 6.08[3][c], at 6-31 (1990). See also Rinaldi v.
Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 369, 397 N.Y.S.2d 943, 947, 366 N.E.2d 1299,
1303 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977); Comment, Statements of Fact, Statements of
Opinion, and the First Amendment, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1001, 1017 (1986).
237. Comment, Statements of Fact, Statements of Opinion, and the First Amendment, 74
CALIF. L. REV. 1001, 1017 (1986).
238. R. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 6.0813][c][ii], at 6-31 (1990). Some courts have
sidestepped the opinion-fact dichotomy altogether and employed verifiability as the sole test in
determining whether a statement is actionable. See Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910,
913 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub nom. Hotchner v. Doubleday & Co., 434 U.S. 834 (1977);
Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican-American, Inc., 448 A.2d 1317, 1319 (Conn. 1982); Buck-
ley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1976); McHale v. Lake Charles American Press, 390 So. 2d
556 (La. Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 941 (1981). Most courts, however, examine the
verifiability of a statement in conjunction with other factors to ascertain whether a statement
should be protected as opinion. See R. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 6.07[1], at 6-25
(1990); Comment, Statements of Fact, Statements of Opinion, and the First Amendment, 74
CALIF. L. REV. 1001, 1018 (1986).
239. Olman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 981 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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be incapable of objective proof if it cannot be proven evidentially.2" For
example, a statement claiming that a Caucasian police officer harassed a
black homeless person for social status reasons is very difficult to
prove.24' Alternatively, the statement may be unverifiable if the stan-
dards of comparison for the statement are ambiguous.24 2 For instance,
proving that an individual's behavior is "cruel" may be impossible be-
cause there is no universally accepted definition of cruelty.24 3 Without
objective proof, evaluating a statement's truthfulness becomes specula-
tive and arbitrary. 2" A statement is therefore protected opinion if it can-
not be proven objectively.245
The third prong of the Oilman test focuses on the literary context of
the allegedly defamatory statement. 246 This inquiry examines the lan-
guage surrounding the statement to determine how it would be under-
stood.247  As the Oilman court stated, readers will inevitably be
influenced by the actual language accompanying the statement.248 Any
cautionary language surrounding a statement, such as "I think," "Isn't it
true that ... ?", or "in my opinion," warns the reader not to interpret the
statement as factual.249 The language of the entire column may signal
that a particular statement that, by itself, appears factual, is actually a
240. Comment, Statements of Fact, Statements of Opinion, and the First Amendment, 74
CALIF. L. REV. 1001, 1019 (1986).
241. Id. at 1019-20, 1053. See Cibenko v. Worth Publishers, 510 F. Supp. 761 (D.N.J.
1981) (court dismissed after holding that the statement was an opinion).
242. Comment, Statements of Fact, Statements of Opinion, and the First Amendment, 74
CALIF. L. REV. 1001, 1019-20 (1986).
243. Id. at 1020.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 982 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
247. Comment, Statements of Fact, Statements of Opinion, and the First Amendment, 74
CALIF. L. REV. 1001, 1020 (1986).
248. Oilman, 750 F.2d at 982-83. See also R. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION
§ 6.08[3][c][iii], at 6-32 (1990).
249. Comment, Statements of Fact, Statements of Opinion, and the First Amendment, 74
CALIF. L. REV. 1001, 1020 (1986). See Pease v. Telegraph Publishing Co., 121 N.H. 62, 426
A.2d 463, 465 (1981) (stating that cautionary language puts the reader on notice that what is
being read is opinion and thus weakens any inference that the author possesses knowledge of
damaging, undisclosed facts); Burns v. McGraw-Hill Broadcasting Co., 659 P.2d 1351, 1360
(Colo. 1983) (finding that when the reasonable reader encounters cautionary language, he
tends to discount that which follows). See also R. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION
§ 6.08[3][c][iii], at 6-32 (1990).
Of course, cautionary language is not always dispositive. As Judge Friendly observed in
Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54, 64 (2d Cir. 1980), one should not "escape
liability for accusations of crime simply by using, explicitly or implicitly, the words 'I think.' "
Such labelling does, however, strongly militate in favor of the statement as opinion. Scott v.
The News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 496 N.E.2d 699 (1986).
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statement of opinion. 250  For example, in Bresler, the newspaper's de-
scription of the substance of the land developer's negotiating proposals
plainly transformed the ostensibly factual allegation of "blackmail" into
an expression of opinion.251
The fourth factor of the Olman test looks at the broader social con-
text, or medium, into which the statement fits. 25 2 Some types of writing,
by custom or convention, signal to readers or listeners that what is being
read is likely to be opinion, not fact.25 3 Factors to be considered are the
type of article, its placement in a newspaper,254 and any public contro-
versy in which the statement was made.255 For example, when the state-
ment occurs on the opinion-editorial (Op-Ed) page of a newspaper, it is
more likely to be perceived as opinion than fact.2 56 The Op-Ed page is
known to be a forum for controversy, reserved for the expression of opin-
ion.257 Furthermore, it is well understood that editorial writers and com-
mentators frequently "resort to the type of caustic bombast traditionally
used in editorial writing to stimulate public reaction. 
' 258
250. Oilman, 750 F.2d at 982 (citing Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S.
6 (1970)).
251. Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 982 (D.C. Cir. 1984). See also Rinsley v. Brandt, 700
F.2d 1304, 1309 (10th Cir. 1983) (holding that an allegedly defamatory statement that plaintiff
doctor had "a theory to which [he was] willing to sacrifice a life" was protected as opinion,
because of the author's contextual descriptions of the doctor's method of treatment and the
circumstances of a patient's death).
252. Oilman, 750 F.2d at 983; R. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 6.08[3][c][iv], at 6-33
(1990).
253. Oilman, 750 F.2d at 983. See also R. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 6.08[3][c][iv],
at 6-33 (1990). Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566, comment e (1977) (stating that
some statements appear in the form of opinion, or even of fact, but cannot be reasonably
interpreted to be meant literally and seriously, and are thus mere vituperation and abuse.)
254. Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 253, 496 N.E.2d 699, 708 (1986).
255. Note, Fact and Opinion in Defamation: Recognizing the Formative Power of Context, 58
FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 779-80 (1990). For examples of social context categories that have
been found to signal opinion, see Southern Air Transp., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos.,
877 F.2d 1010, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (involving political debate over aid to Nicaraguan con-
tras); Secrist v. Harkin, 874 F.2d 1244, 1249 (8th Cir.) (senatorial campaign), cert. denied 110
S. Ct. 324 (1989); Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300, 1304-05 (8th Cir.) (political
disputes and controversial criminal prosecutions on an Indian reservation), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 883 (1986); Catalfo v. Jensen, 657 F. Supp. 463, 468 (D.N.H. 1987) (political primary);
Steinhilber v. Alphonse, 68 N.Y.2d 283, 287-88, 501 N.E.2d 550, 551, 508 N.Y.S.2d 901, 902
(1986) (union dispute); Henderson v. Times Mirror Co., 669 F. Supp. 356, 359 (D. Colo. 1987)
(sports controversy - player's agent referred to as "sleaze bag" by football coach) aff'd mem.,
876 F.2d 1078 (10th Cir. 1989); Potomac Valve & Fitting Inc. v. Crawford Fitting Co., 829
F.2d 1280, 1290 (4th Cir. 1987) (business competition); Deupree v. Iliff, 860 F.2d 300, 304 (8th
Cir. 1988) (charged debate on topic of social controversy - sex education in schools).
256. Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 1012 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (MacKinnon, J.,
concurring).
257. Id. at 1010 (Bork, J., concurring).
258. Id. at 984 (quoting Nat'l Rifle Ass'n v. Dayton Newspapers, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 1299,
1309 (S.D. Ohio 1983)).
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For these reasons, the court in Loeb v. Globe Newspaper Co. 25 9 found
that a comment on a newspaper's editorial page was protected opinion, in
light of the statement's specific context at issue.26 In Price v. Viking
Penguin, Inc.,261 the court held that statements made in the course of a
political debate are more likely to be understood as opinion.262 Thus, in
analyzing the distinction between fact and opinion, a court must take
into account the setting and varying social conventions or customs inher-
ent in different types of writing.263
2. Analysis of the Milkovich Facts Under Olman
Under the four-prong Olman test, the statements challenged in
Milkovich were constitutionally protected opinion.26' The first two fac-
tors - specific language and verifiability of the statement - taken alone
would suggest the conclusion that Diadiun's column was factual.
265
Under the first prong, the specific language used in the allegedly defama-
tory statement - "Milkovich . . . lied at the hearing after ... having
given his solemn oath to tell the truth" 266 - is factual. 267 An analysis of
its common meaning yields the conclusion that Milkovich committed
perjury. 268 Specific allegations of criminal conduct 269 are potentially ac-
tionable, although the distinction between specific and general charges is
often difficult to discern.2 7 °
Diadiun's allegation that Milkovich committed perjury is also verifi-
able. 2 ' Whether or not Milkovich lied at the court hearing can certainly
be proven by a perjury action with evidence drawn from the transcripts
259. 489 F. Supp. 481 (D. Mass. 1980).
260. Id. See also Olman, 750 F.2d at 984.
261. 881 F.2d 1426 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 757 (1990).
262. Id. at 1433.
263. Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 984 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
264. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2709 (1990).
265. Clayton, High Court. No Federal Privilege for 'Opinion'Found Defamatory, Nat'l L.J.,
Aug. 27, 1990, at 27, col. 3.
266. See supra note 55 (entire text of Diadiun's article).
267. Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 251, 496 N.E.2d 699, 707 (1986).
268. Perjury is defined as the "willful telling of a lie while under lawful oath." WEBSTER'S
NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 1005 (3d ed. 1988).
269. A specific allegation of criminal conduct is a charge that could reasonably be under-
stood as imputing specific criminal or other wrongful acts to an individual (e.g., alleging plain-
tiff to be a rapist). Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54, 64 (2d Cir. 1980).
270. Scott, 25 Ohio St. 3d at 250, 496 N.E.2d at 706. See R. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMA-
TION § 6.12[9], at 6-51 (stating that general references to the "repentance of criminals," or
characterization of a book as a "fraud" on readers, were protected opinion, whereas criminal
allegations phrased in relatively specific terms will usually not be construed as protected
opinion).
271. Scott, 25 Ohio St. 3d at 253, 496 N.E.2d at 707.
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and witnesses present at the hearing.272 Under the verifiability criterion,
the allegedly defamatory language is an objectively verifiable event.273
Although the first two factors suggest that Diadiun's comments are
factual, the third factor points to the conclusion that the column is pro-
2741 hitected opinion. In their larger context, the averred actionable state-
ments are prefaced by cautionary terms, or language of apparency. 275 A
large caption - "TD Says"276 _ precedes the article, indicating to even
the most gullible reader that the article is opinion.277 This assumption is
supported by the carryover page headline: "Diadiun says Maple told a
lie." '278 These signals effectively inform the reader that Diadiun's state-
ments are merely his considered opinions.279
The language surrounding the allegedly defamatory statements also
indicates the subjective basis behind Diadiun's writing.280 For example,
Diadiun states: "When a person takes on a job in a school, whether it be
as a teacher, coach, administrator or even maintenance worker, it is well
to remember that his primary job is that of educator."' 28 ' The article
emphasizes this concern that people in positions of authority, at any
level, also hold positions of responsibility requiring truthfulness, should
their authority be called into question.28 2 In context, the issue was not
the statement that Milkovich had lied at a legal hearing.28 3 Rather,
based on his attendance at the wrestling match and the OHSAA hearing,
Diadiun believed that any position taken by Milkovich amounting to less
than a full admission of culpability was a lie.
284
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Clayton, High Court: No Federal Privilege for 'Opinion'Found Defamatory, Nat'l L.J.,
Aug. 27, 1990, at 27, col. 3.
275. Burns v. McGraw-Hill Broadcasting Co., 659 P.2d 1351, 1360 & n.4 (Colo. 1983)
(explaining that language of apparency, such as "in my opinion," gives the reasonable listener
grounds to discount that which follows it). See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct.
2695, 2712 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Information Control Corp. v. Genesis
One Computer Corp., 611 F.2d 781, 784 (9th Cir. 1980) (finding that a statement phrased in
language of apparency is less likely to be understood as a statement of fact than as a statement
of opinion); Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 596, 603, 131 Cal. Rptr. 641,
644, 552 P.2d 425, 429 (1976) (concluding that a letter that was cautiously phrased in terms of
apparency did not imply factual assertions); Stewart v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 151 Ill. App. 3d
888, 894, 503 N.E.2d 580, 583 (1987) (finding that a letter couched in language of opinion
rather than firsthand knowledge did not imply factual assertions).
276. Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 277, 496 N.E.2d 699, 727 (1986).
277. Id. at 252, 496 N.E.2d at 707.
278. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2698 (1990) (emphasis added).
279. Scott, 25 Ohio St. 3d at 252, 496 N.E.2d at 707.
280. Id.
281. See supra note 55 (full text of Diadiun's article).
282. Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 252, 496 N.E.2d 699, 707 (1986).
283. Id. at 252, 496 N.E.2d at 707-08.
284. Id. at 252, 496 N.E.2d at 708.
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Additionally, Diadiun acknowledges at the beginning of his article
that the court hearing involved the issue of whether Maple was denied
due process by OHSAA.2"s Although an average reader might not un-
derstand that a due process hearing probably would not involve ques-
tions relating to specific prior conduct beyond technical OHSAA
procedures, Diadiun's caveat that due process was the actual issue is nev-
ertheless a factor to be considered.2"6 Taken in context, Diadiun's sur-
rounding language transforms his ostensibly factual allegation of lying
under oath into an expression of opinion.2"7
Under the fourth prong of the Olman test, the broader context of
Diadiun's statements signals to the reader that they are opinion rather
than fact.288 The article at issue was written by a sports reporter, rather
than a law correspondent, and is prefaced by the byline: "By TED
DIADIUN[,] News-Herald Sports Writer."28 9 The column did not ap-
pear on the front page; rather, it appeared on the sports page - a tradi-
tional haven for persuasion, invective, and hyperbole.29 Most readers
would not expect a sports writer on the sports page to be very knowl-
edgeable about procedural due process and perjury.291 Any "legal con-
clusion" in such a context would therefore be construed as the writer's
opinion."' Thus, while Diadiun's statements appear to be factual when
analyzed under the first two factors alone, the third and fourth indicia
dictate the conclusion that, based upon the totality of circumstances, the
column is constitutionally protected opinion.293
3. The Restatement Test
After determining that a particular statement is opinion rather than
fact, courts often apply a second framework of analysis before they will
find the statement constitutionally protected.294 Relying on the prece-
285. See supra note 55 (full text of Diadiun's article).
286. Scott, 25 Ohio St. 3d at 253, 496 N.E.2d at 708.
287. Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 983 (D.C. Cir. 1984). See also Rinsley v. Brandt, 700
F.2d 1304 (10th Cir. 1983).
288. See Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 253-54, 496 N.E.2d 699, 708 (1986).
289. Id. at 253, 496 N.E.2d at 708.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 253-54, 496 N.E.2d at 708.
292. Id. at 254, 496 N.E.2d at 708.
293. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2700 (1990); Scott v. News-Herald,
25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 254, 496 N.E.2d 699, 709 (1986). See Clayton, High Court: No Federal
Privilege for 'Opinion' Found Defamatory, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 27, 1990, at 27, col. 3.
294. Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 984 (D.C. Cir. 1984). See also Comment, Statements
of Fact, Statements of Opinion, and the First Amendment, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1001, 1012 n.70
(1986). The Ollman court supported the Restatement approach, but felt that its own four-
prong test was sufficient in determining whether a statement implies the existence of undis-
closed facts. The court reasoned that a separate inquiry into whether a statement, already
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dential test set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts,29 5 a court may
determine the actionability of a statement by asking if it implies the exist-
ence of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion.296 If it
does not, the statement warrants constitutional protection.297
According to section 566 of the Restatement, a comment that im-
plies the existence of undisclosed defamatory facts to justify the opinion
expressed is called a "mixed" opinion, as distinguished from a "pure"
opinion.2 If the author of the opinion does not disclose the facts upon
which the comment is based, or implies the existence of undisclosed de-
famatory facts that a reader infers, the opinion is "mixed" and may be
objectionable.299 Its objectionability depends on whether reasonable
readers would have actually interpreted the statement to imply defama-
tory facts.3°° If no reader would do so, despite the writer's providing
only a partial factual predicate or none at all, the opinion will not sup-
port a defamation action.310
In contrast, a "pure" opinion is made when the author states all the
facts on which the opinion is based, or makes a comment knowing that
his readers are already aware of the facts upon which the opinion is
based.30 2 By treating the underlying facts and the opinion separately, the
classified in a painstaking way as opinion, implies allegedly defamatory facts, would be super-
fluous. Olman, 750 F.2d at 985.
295. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 (1977).
296. Id. See also R. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 6.04, at 6-16.2 (1990).
The majority in Milkovich alluded to the Restatement test, stating that expressions of
opinion may often imply an assertion of objective fact. According to the majority Court, even
if the speaker states the facts upon which he bases his opinion, if those facts are either incorrect
or incomplete, or if his assessment of them is erroneous, the statement may still imply a false
assertion of fact. 110 S. Ct. at 2705-06.
The dissent in Milkovich also utilized the Restatement test (in addition to the Olman
factors). Analogizing to comment c of section 566, the dissent stated that clear disclosure of a
comment's factual predicate precludes a finding that the comment implies other defamatory
facts. Thus, an opinion - "I think Jones lied about his age just now" - that is preceded by
supporting explanatory statements - "Jones' brother once lied to me; Jones just told me he
was 25; I've never met Jones before and I don't actually know how old he is or anything else
about him, but he looks sixteen" - does not imply defamatory facts. 110 S. Ct. at 2710 n.3.
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 comment c, illustration 4 (1977).
297. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 comment c (1977).
298. Id. at § 566 comments b-c; R. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 6.04, at 6-16.2 to 6-
17 (1990).
299. R. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 6.04[2], at 6-17 (1990).
300. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2710 n.3 (1990) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting). While a complete disclosure of a comment's factual predicate precludes a finding
that the comment implies other defamatory facts, it does not follow that a statement, preceded
by only a partial factual predicate or none at all, necessarily implies other facts. The operative
question remains whether reasonable readers would have actually understood the statement to
imply defamatory facts. Id.
301. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2710 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
302. R. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 6.04[l], at 6-16.2 (1990).
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"comment" that the writer draws from those facts is always pure opinion
and never actionable.3 "3 If the factual predicate for the opinion is true,
the opinion, no matter how unfair, unreasonable, or outrageous, is itself
immune from actionability. 3°
Under the Restatement test, Diadiun's commentary in Milkovich
was pure opinion, in the form of conjecture, and thus inactionable.
30 5
Diadiun provided his readers with all the background facts necessary to
support his assumption that Milkovich had lied at the court hearing.
Diadiun relayed to his readers his observations at the wrestling match-
turned-melee, his impressions of Milkovich's testimony at the OHSAA
hearing, and Dr. Meyer's comments following the hearing at the Court of
Common Pleas.30 7 Diadiun's opinion that Milkovich perjured himself at
the court hearing arose from this factual predicate.308 In context, his
opinion could be reasonably interpreted only as an assumption that he
had inferred from the stated facts. 3" Readers could infer only that
Diadiun had drawn this inference. 310 Although Diadiun's opinion was
ostensibly in the form of a factual statement, it was clear from the con-
text that he intended to assert solely his personal observations on the
facts he had stated.3 1 Since Diadiun's inference appeared sincere and
nondefamatory, neither he nor the News-Herald should be liable for dam-
ages under the Restatement analysis.312
Furthermore, Diadiun not only revealed the facts upon which he
relied to formulate his opinion that Milkovich had lied, but he clearly
indicated at which point he began to speculate.31 3 After describing the
events of the OHSAA hearing, Diadiun openly surmised when he began
to rely on Dr. Meyer's statements.31 4 Using words like "seemed," "prob-
ably," and "apparently, ' 31 5 Diadiun plainly showed that he did not at-
303. Id. at 6-16.3.
304. Id. at 6-16.3 to 6-17.
305. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2711 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing). See Gross, Opinions Left Unprotected by Supreme Court Ruling, Pa. L.J.-Rep., Aug. 6,
1990, at 8, col. 3.
306. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2711 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See supra note 55 (full text of
Diadiun's article).
307. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2711 (Brennan, J. dissenting). See supra note 55.
308. See Milkovich, I 10 S. Ct. at 2711 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Brief of Respondents at 6,
Milkovich (No. 89-645) (stating that Diadiun clearly remembered his conversations with Dr.
Meyer following the court hearing); supra note 55 (full text of Diadiun's article).
309. See Milkovich, l10 S. Ct. at 2710-11.
310. See generally Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2710 (1990).
311. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 comment b (1977).
312. See 110 S. Ct. at 2710-11 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
313. Id. at 2711.
314. Id.
315. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2711 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing). See also supra note 55 (full text of Diadiun's article).
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tend the court hearing, and that he had no detailed secondhand account
of Milkovich's court testimony.31 6 Furthermore, he quoted a third
party's version of the incidents and disclaimed any firsthand knowl-
edge. 317  Readers could perceive that Diadiun's implication that
Milkovich had lied arose from Diadiun's interpretation of why the trial
court had reversed the OHSAA decision.3"' Since Diadiun's comment
was pure conjecture, no reasonable reader could interpret it to assert, as
fact, that Milkovich had perjured himself.31 9 Thus, Diadiun's statements
were neither defamatory nor objectionable.
4. Proper Analysis of the Milkovich Facts Under
the .Majority's Standard
Analysis of Diadiun's column under the rule enunciated by the
Milkovich majority also results in the conclusion that the challenged
statements could not reasonably be interpreted to state or imply defama-
tory facts.320 Due to the kind of language that Diadiun used and the
context in which it appeared, no reader could have reasonably concluded
that his opinion stated or implied that Milkovich had committed per-
jury.32I For instance, when Diadiun intimated that Milkovich had re-
peated, in court, a more plausible version of the misrepresentations he
made at the OHSAA hearing, Diadiun preceded it with the term "appar-
ently.' '322 This cautionary language warns the reader that the statements
are to be treated as opinion, not fact.
323
Diadiun's exaggerated and emotional tone also warns readers to ex-
pect speculation and personal judgment.324 For example, Diadiun opines
that the board placed the Maple High School wrestling team on proba-
tion, "probably as much in distasteful reaction to the chicanery of
[Milkovich] as in displeasure over the actual incident. '325 The words
"distasteful," "chicanery," and "displeasure" are laden with moral out-
rage.326 Never stating explicitly that Milkovich committed perjury,
316. Id. at 2711-12.
317. Id. at 2711.
318. Id. at 2712.
319. Id. at 2711.
320. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal, 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2709 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
321. See id. at 2709.
322. Id. at 2712. See also supra note 55 (full text of Diadiun's article).
323. See generally Comment, Statements of Fact, Statements of Opinion, and the First
Amendment, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1001, 1020 (1986).
324. Id. at 2712 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
325. See supra note 55 (full text of Diadiun's article).
326. Distasteful is defined as "unpleasant to taste; causing distaste; disagreeable"; the defini-
tion of chicanery is "the use of clever but tricky talk or action to deceive, evade, etc."; displea-
sure is defined as "dissatisfaction, disapproval, annoyance." WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD
DICTIONARY 398, 242, 396 (3d ed. 1988).
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Diadiun comments, "[a]nyone who attended the meet.., knows in his
heart" that Milkovich lied.327 Like the Bresler-Falwell-Letter Carriers 
328
cases, this statement is obvious hyperbole, since Diadiun does not profess
to have researched the innermost feelings of everyone who attended the
match. 329 The rhetorical and subjective tenor of Diadiun's assertions sig-
nals that specific statements which, standing alone, would appear to be
factual, are actually expressions of opinion.33°
Additionally, the overall context of Diadiun's statements clues read-
ers to interpret them as speculative opinion, rather than factual asser-
tions. 331 The format of the piece is a signed editorial column displaying a
photograph of the columnist.332 Both the title logo and the carryover
headline incorporate the phrase "[Diadiun] Says."' 333 Although signed
columns may include statements of fact, they are also the "well recog-
nized home of opinion and comment., 334 All of these indicators notify
and remind readers that they are reading one man's commentary.335
Thus, Diadiun's column merited full constitutional protection under the
majority's articulated rule.336
D. The Court Should Have Protected Opinion in Commentary
1. Proposed Approaches
The Milkovich Court claimed that existing first amendment doc-
trine, with its protection of certain types of opinion such as rhetorical
hyperbole, will sufficiently safeguard the free speech rights of newspapers
and journalists.337 While the rhetorical hyperbole standard admittedly
serves as somewhat of a safe haven 338 against meritless defamation
claims, it protects only opinion that is exaggerated, rhetorical, vulgar, or
unlikely to be believed.339 Many statements of opinion fall below this
327. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2712-13 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
328. See supra text accompanying notes 103-19 (regarding Bresler-Falwell-Letter Carriers
line of cases).
329. Id. at 2713.
330. See Comment, Statements of Fact, Statements of Opinion, and the First Amendment, 74
CALIF. L. REV. 1001, 1020 (1986).
331. See id. at 2712 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
332. Id. at 2713.
333. Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 277, 496 N.E.2d 699, 727.
334. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2713 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(quoting Mr. Chow of New York v. Ste. Jour Azur S.A., 759 F.2d 219, 227 (2d Cir. 1985)).
335. Id. at 2713 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
336. Id. at 2709 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
337. Id. at 2706; id. at 2708 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
338. Goodale, 'Milkovich : A Modest Loss for the Press, N.Y. L.J., June 27, 1990, at 2, col. 4.
339. See supra text accompanying notes 103-19 (constitutional protection for expressions of
rhetorical hyperbole).
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standard and will be highly susceptible to a flood of litigation) 4°
Especially vulnerable to libel claims after Milkovich will be com-
mentary, or "opinion-journalism."1341  Commentary comprises specific
genres of literary writing that courts have found to signal opinion: edito-
rials,342 Op-Ed pieces,343 newspaper columns, 3" letters to the editor,345
humorous and satirical articles, restaurant reviews, campaign press re-
leases, political cartoons,3 46 sports columns, and first-person narratives in
newspapers. First amendment protections are particularly important
340. See Suing the Reviewer, Wash. Post, Aug. 26, 1990, at C6, col. 1 (stating that the
danger of the Milkovich decision is the possibility that a flood of litigation will promptly
emerge to test the new borders of libel). See also supra note 24 (predictions of Milkovich's
impact).
341. Gross, Opinions Left Unprotected by Supreme Court Ruling, Pa. L.J.-Rep., Aug. 6,
1990, at 4, col. 2-3 (stating that the Milkovich decision puts into doubt areas of journalism
previously considered "safe": criticism of esthetics, such as restaurant reviews; editorialization
(i.e., serious comment on everyday affairs); and quotations of another's allegations); Clayton,
High Court: No Federal Privilege for 'Opinion'Found Defamatory, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 27, 1990,
at 27, col. 1 (stating that the impact of Milkovich will probably be greatest on material such as
editorials, columns and letters to the editor); Moore, Press Clipping, 22 NAT'L J. 3086 (1990)
(citing the New York Times' brief in support of a summary judgment motion in Moldea v. New
York Times Co., No. 90-2053 (D.D.C. filed Aug. 23, 1990): "No review, whether of books,
restaurants, or theater, nor many editorials or political columns, will be safe from rigid - and
chilling - legal oversight"). For a contrary view, see Streitfeld, Author Sues Over Negative
Review; Criticism Was Libelous, D.C. Writer Charges, Wash. Post, Aug. 24, 1990, at Cl, col. 2
(quoting Henry R. Kaufman, general counsel for the Libel Defense Resource Center, predict-
ing that "in those areas [like commentary] where there had been broad protection, one way or
another there will continue to be protection").
Commentary is synonymous with "opinion-journalism." Interview with Timothy Alger,
former Assistant Metropolitan Editor of the Orange County Register, in Los Angeles (Nov. 24,
1990).
342. Specifically, an editorial is an unsigned position piece, written by the newspaper's edi-
torial staff, that states the newspaper's position on issues of controversy or endorsement of
political figures. Interview with Timothy Alger, former Assistant Metropolitan Editor of the
Orange County Register, in Los Angeles (Nov. 24, 1990).
343. R. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 6.12[4], at 6-45 to 6-46 (1990) (stating that
"[tihe Op-Ed page is one of the great American forums for the free exchange of vitriolic de-
bate, and readers can be expected to discount the statements made in that context as more
likely to be the stuff of opinion than fact"). The Op-Ed page contains signed pieces stating the
views of outside authors or staff members. Interview with Timothy Alger, former Assistant
Metropolitan Editor of the Orange County Register, in Los Angeles (Nov. 24, 1990). See supra
notes 256-57 (Ollman decision describing Op-Ed pages as a forum for expression of opinion).
344. Entertainment reviews and columns commenting on local issues are generally written
by staff members. Syndicated columnists ordinarily author pieces discussing national con-
cerns. Interview with Timothy Alger, former Assistant Metropolitan Editor of the Orange
County Register, in Los Angeles (Nov. 24, 1990).
345. See Immuno A.G. v. Moor-Jankowski, 18 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1625, 1632-34 (1991)
(explaining the public forum function of letters to the editor).
346. Like an editorial, a political cartoon is an opinion, not a statement of alleged fact. This
makes it significantly different from a news report that purports to convey strictly fact. King,
What's So Funny About Washington N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1990, § 6 (Magazine), at 29, col. 1.
347. See Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 986-87 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Note, Fact and Opinion
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to the press in these areas, because journalists cover them extensively.348
Under totality of circumstances tests like Oilman, lower courts had con-
cluded that otherwise factual statements, when considered fully in the
context of commentary, were protected opinion.34 9
The Milkovich rule, however, focuses on the issue of whether a rea-
sonable factfinder could conclude that a statement implies defamatory
facts.35° Consequently, statements that would have been deemed opinion
because of their context will now survive a defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment, and may be found actionable.35' It will be easy for
courts to conclude in many cases that reasonable factfinders could infer
defamatory facts from a challenged statement.35 2 In the Eighth Circuit's
words: "[a]s a practical matter, every opinion involves implied or as-
serted facts.",35 3 The new rule could have a chilling effect on columnists
as well as publishers, who fear an entirely new class of lawsuits.
354
in Defamation: Recognizing the Formative Power of Context, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 778
(1990). See, e.g., Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Dow Jones & Co., 838 F.2d 1287, 1290, 1300 (D.C.
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 75 (1988) (newspaper column); Epstein v. Trustees of Dow-
ling College, 152 A.D.2d 534, 543 N.Y.S.2d 691, 692 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (letters in student
newspaper); Fudge v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 840 F.2d 1012, 1015-16 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. de-
nied, 109 S. Ct. 65 (1988) (humorous article in magazine); Catalfo v. Jensen, 657 F. Supp. 463,
465 (D.N.H. 1987) (magazine satire of political figure); Mr. Chow v. Ste. Jour Azur, S.A., 759
F.2d 219, 227-29 (2d Cir. 1985) (restaurant review); Mashburn v. Collin, 355 So. 2d 879, 888-
89 (La. 1977) (restaurant review); Secrist v. Harkin, 874 F.2d 1244, 1249 (8th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 324 (1989) (campaign press release); Henderson v. Times Mirror Co., 669 F.
Supp. 356, 357, 359-60 (D. Colo. 1987) (sports column); Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d
243, 251, 496 N.E.2d 699, 706-07 (1986) (sports column); McCabe v. Rattiner, 814 F.2d 839,
843 (1st Cir. 1987) (first-person narrative).
348. Gross, Opinions Left Unprotected by Supreme Court Ruling, Pa. L.J.-Rep., Aug. 6,
1990, at 4, col. 1.
349. Note, Fact and Opinion in Defamation: Recognizing the Formative Power of Context, 58
FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 778-79 & nn.108-116 (1990).
350. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2707 (1990).
351. Clayton, High Court: No Federal Privilege for 'Opinion' Found Defamatory, Nat'l L.J.,
Aug. 27, 1990, at 28, col. 1. According to one author, the Milkovich Court's lack of clear rules
for determining the actionability of a statement gives lower courts broad discretion to construe
the reasonable-reader standard in favor of defamation plaintiffs. Furthermore, the majority's
conclusion that a reasonable factfinder could determine that Diadiun's statements were actual
assertions of fact was pro-plaintiff, and could lead some lower courts to liberally interpret the
"reasonable factfinder" standard in favor of plaintiffs. See The Supreme Court, 1989 Term--
Leading Cases, 104 HARV. L. REV. 219, 224 & n.56 (1990).
352. Clayton, High Court: No Federal Privilege for 'Opinion' Found Defamatory, Nat'l L.J.,
Aug. 27, 1990, at 28, col. 1.
353. Id. (quoting Price v. Viking Penguin Inc., 881 F.2d 1426, 1433 (8th Cir. 1989)).
354. Sitomer, Can 'Opinion' Be Libelous?, Christian Sci. Monitor, Aug. 9, 1990, at 14, col.
2. See Marcus & Pink, Statements of Opinion Can Be Libelous, Court Rules; Expressions With
'False and Defamatory' Facts Not Automatically Shielded, Justices Find, Wash. Post, Jun. 22,
1990, at A4, col. 1 (quoting media law expert Bruce Sanford as saying, "Columnists might
tend to look for the potential plaintiff before writing a column, and avoid people they feel will
be litigious").
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In order to preserve freedom of expression in the press, the Court
should have carved out an exception for opinion in commentary. 355 The
Court could have provided shelter for opinion-journalism in one of two
ways. First, the Court could have interpreted the Constitution to protect
commentary opinion under an expansion of the shield for rhetorical hy-
perbole.356 Under this augmented exception, journalists who base their
statements on conjecture or surmise would be immune to libel actions.357
Just as the first amendment protects rhetorical hyperbole and imagina-
tive expression because of their metaphorical, exaggerated, or even fan-
tastic use, 358 so the Constitution should protect commentators who state
certain facts and then leap to a conclusion. 35 9 Readers will perceive the
writer's speculation from the emotional or rhetorical tone, mood, and
355. In Scott v. News-Herald, a concurring justice stated that the court had made it clear
that opinions stated in a column, cartoon, or an editorial are constitutionally protected free
speech. Scott, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 262, 496 N.E.2d 699, 715 (1986) (Wright, J., concurring).
356. See Gross, Opinions Left Unprotected by Supreme Court Ruling, Pa. L.J.-Rep., Aug. 6,
1990, at 8, col. 5. The dissent in Milkovich also advocated expanding the rhetorical hyperbole
exception to give broader protection to allegedly defamatory opinion. Under the dissent's pro-
posal, constitutional protection would be provided for what it described as conjecture. Conjec-
ture alerts the audience that the statement is one of belief, not fact. The dissent appeared to
conclude that the first amendment ought to protect a writer who, after stating certain facts,
arrives at a conclusion. Gross, supra. In Justice Brennan's view, punishing conjecture pro-
tected reputation only at the cost of eradicating a genuinely useful mechanism for public de-
bate. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2710 & n.5, 2715 (1990).
State and federal courts have held that readers can recognize conjecture that neither states
nor implies any assertions of fact, in the same way that readers can recognize hyperbole. For
example, in Potomac Valve & Fitting Co. v. Crawford Fitting Co., 829 F.2d 1280 (4th Cir.
1987), the court found that a disparaging statement readily appeared to be nothing more than
the author's personal inference from the test results. The premises were explicit, and the
reader was not at all required to share the author's conclusion. Similarly, the court in Dunlap
v. Wayne, 105 Wash. 2d 529, 540, 716 P.2d 842, 849 (1986), concluded that [a]rguments for
actionability disappear when the audience members know the facts underlying an assertion
and can judge the truthfulness of the allegedly defamatory statement themselves." Likewise,
in Nat'l Ass'n of Gov't Employees, Inc. v. Cent. Broadcasting Corp., 379 Mass. 200, 226, 396
N.E.2d 996, 1000 (1979), the court found that, since listeners were told the facts upon which a
radio talk show host based her conclusion, they could "make up their own minds and generate
their own opinions or ideas which might or might not accord with [the host's]." Milkovich,
110 S. Ct. at 2712 n.7 (1990).
357. Gross, Opinions Left Unprotected by Supreme Court Ruling, Pa. L.J.-Rep., Aug. 6,
1990, at 8, col. 3. See also Clayton, High Court: No Federal Privilege for 'Opinion' Found
Defamatory, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 27, 1990, at 28, col. 1.
358. See Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 982, 1000-01 (D.C. Cir. 1984). See also Informa-
tion Control Corp. v. Genesis One Computer Corp., 611 F.2d 781, 784 (9th Cir. 1980); Myers
v. Boston Magazine Co., 380 Mass. 336, 403 N.E.2d 376 (1980); Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd.,
695 F.2d 438, 443 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132 (1983); supra text accompany-
ing notes 103-19 (protection for rhetorical hyperbole).
359. Gross, Opinions Left Unprotected by Supreme Court Ruling, Pa. L.J.-Rep., Aug. 6,
1990, at 8, col. 3.
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format of the article.3" Thus, a conclusion that "the mayor has deceived
the public with his campaign promises," ostensibly implying a defama-
tory fact, should receive the same first amendment protection as an alle-
gation that "the public deserves a better mayor," which expresses an
idea.361
Alternatively, the Court could have adopted the Olman test, em-
phasizing the fourth factor - broader social context - to give guidance
to lower courts in their determination of libelous and non-libelous opin-
ion.362 Context is crucial, and can turn what, out of context, appears to
be a factual statement into an opinion that is socially valuable and not
actionable.3 63 According to Justice Holmes: "A word is not a crystal,
transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may
vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and
time in which it is used. ' ' 36' Arguably, context is the most important
consideration in distinguishing between actionable statements of fact and
constitutionally protected opinion.365
The literary genre or medium in which a particular statement ap-
pears dispositively influences a reader's understanding of the statement's
366meaning. Since early colonial America, individuals have published
and circulated sharp and acerbic commentary on issues of social and
360. See 110 S. Ct. at 2709; supra text accompanying notes 103-19 (protection for rhetorical
hyperbole).
361. See Warren, Heinke & Sager, Not as Bad as It Looks, Nat'l L.J., July 30, 1990, at 14,
col. 2.
362. See Comment, Statements of Fact, Statements of Opinion, and the First Amendment, 74
CALIF. L. REV. 1001, 1019, 1055-56 (1986) (stating that Oilman provides a lucid bright-line
rule for distinguishing between defamatory statements and non-actionable opinion). But see
Note, The Fact-Opinion Distinction in First Amendment Libel Law: The Need for a Bright-Line
Rule, 72 GEO. L.J. 1817, 1846 (1984) (criticizing fact-opinion tests, such as that presented in
Oilman, for providing minimal guidance to writers in structuring a statement to avoid liability
for defamation; journalists must speculate where and when the works will be published, and
guess which of the surrounding circumstances might be deemed relevant).
363. Olman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1984 (Bork, J., concurring).
364. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918).
365. See Note, Fact and Opinion in Defamation: Recognizing the Formative Power of Con-
text, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 784 (1990) (positing that courts should emphasize context -
the third and fourth Oilman factors - when distinguishing actionable statements of fact from
constitutionally protected opinion. This approach would take into account the formative effect
that context has upon the meaning of a statement. Linguists and philosophers of language
have stressed the formative power of context in determining the meaning of individual words
and sentences. Because context shapes the meaning of individual words and sentences, it also
influences their degree of precision or ambiguity, which is the focus of the first Oilman factor.
Similarly, whether or not a statement is verifiable - the second Oilman factor - depends on
the context in which the remark appears and the purpose for which it was formulated). Id. at
784-87.
366. Oilman, 750 F.2d at 982 (stating that, since readers are inevitably influenced by a
statement's context, the distinction between fact and opinion can be made only in context); R.
SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 6.12[4], at 6-45 to 6-46 (1990) ("[I]t is clear that the edito-
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political interest. 367 Today, columnists and opinion writers carry on this
socially valuable tradition of stimulating debate and persuading readers
through the printed press. 368 Broad comprehension of this traditional
function of opinion-journalism predisposes the average reader to regard
what is found there to be opinion. 369 The reasonable person who reads a
column on the editorial or Op-Ed page is fully aware that statements
printed there are not "hard" news, like the statements found on the front
page or in other news sections. 370 Readers expect that columnists will
make strong statements, often phrased in a critical or polemical manner
that does not seem balanced or fair.371 This understanding is inherent in
the notion of editorial contexts and other commentary. 372 Additionally,
readers anticipate that commentators will express themselves in con-
densed form without providing every background fact, due to limitations
of physical space.373
Opinion-journalism formats signal the reader to anticipate a depar-
ture from what is actually known by the author as fact.374 Because of the
uniquely subjective content of commentary, reasonable readers will rec-
ognize that statements made there are more likely to be opinion than
fact.3 75 The Supreme Court has held that the expression of editorial
opinion is "entitled to the most exacting degree" of constitutional shel-
tering, because it "lies at the heart of [f]irst [a]mendment protection.
'37 6
Thus, statements in the context of opinion-journalism that are unlikely to
be perceived as fact should be nonactionable under the first amend-
ment.37 7 This rule would provide a clarifying guide for courts to distin-
rial context is regarded by courts as a powerful element in construing as opinion what might
otherwise be deemed fact").
367. Oilman, 750 F.2d at 986.
368. Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 986 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
369. Id. at 987.
370. Id. at 986.
371. Id.
372. Id. (citing Nat'l Rifle Ass'n v. Dayton Newspaper, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 1299, 1309 (S.D.
Ohio 1983)).
373. Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 986 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
374. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2713 (1990).
375. R. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 6.12[4], at 6-45 to 6-46 (1990). See Oilman, 750
F.2d at 984 (emphasizing the importance of focusing upon the reader's understanding of a
particular type of writing).
376. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 375-76, 381 (1984)).
377. But see Oilman, 750 F.2d at 987 n.33 (expressly declining to hold that any statement
on an editorial or Op-Ed page is constitutionally protected, for the reason that such a rule
could too readily become a license to libel). This note does not advocate that every statement
found in commentary should be automatically shielded by the first amendment. Under the
proposed rule, an opinion is protected only if it appears in commentary whose overall context
convinces a reasonable reader that the statements contained therein are more likely to be opin-
ion rather than fact.
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guish between defamatory and nondefamatory opinion.378
Under this approach, a court would give great weight to the com-
mentary context of an allegedly defamatory statement in determining
whether it was actionable. 37 9 A disputed statement could be interpreted
only after explicit examination of its broader context.3 80 Even if a writer
fails to fully disclose facts that would warn the reader that an allegedly
defamatory statement was a characterization, the type and placement of
the writing may transform the statement into one readily understood as
opinion.381 If a court found that the context was commentary - one
that a reasonable reader understood to contain opinion rather than fact
- then, in the vast majority of cases, the particular statement would
receive constitutional protection.382
In Kotlikoff v. Community News, 383 for example, the court found
that a letter to the editor charging a mayor with covering up delinquent
taxpayers was opinion, because the charges were made in an editorial
forum context.384 Similarly, in the context of a radio talk show called
"Sound Off," the charge that a labor union was communist was held to
be nonactionable opinion.385 Only if the other Olman factors strongly
indicated the statement to be factual would a court refuse to protect it.
The contextual focus of the Olman test ensures greater judicial pro-
tection for socially valuable opinions. These opinions particularly need
shelter because they foster public debate and are susceptible to libel ac-
tions. 386 By giving weight to context, courts can provide greater leeway
378. Cf Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 987 n.33 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (conceding that a rule
making any statement on an editorial or Op-Ed page constitutionally privileged opinion would
have the advantage of simplicity and clarity).
379. See Note, Fact and Opinion in Defamation: Recognizing the Formative Power of Con-
text, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 763 (1990).
380. Id. at 784.
381. Ollman, 750 F.2d at 985.
382. Cf Note, The Fact-Opinion Distinction in First Amendment Libel Law: The Need for a
Bright-Line Rule, 72 GEO. L.J. 1817, 1851 (1984) (advocating that courts adopt a bright-line
rule allowing the press to label an article as opinion in order to be afforded the absolute protec-
tion discussed in Gertz Under this rule, a statement made in any column appearing on a
clearly labeled editorial or opinion-editorial page of a newspaper would be protected, as would
any statements made in articles individually labelled as opinion. Conversely, any column ap-
pearing without the opinion label would be treated as a statement of fact). The problem with
this approach is that a publisher could easily label an entire newspaper as opinion, forcing
courts to decide which labels are mere pretense. Note, Fact and Opinion in Defamation: Rec-
ognizing the Formative Power of Context, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 778 n.115 (1990).
383. 89 N.J. 62, 444 A.2d 1086 (1982).
384. Id.
385. Nat'l Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. Cent. Broadcasting Corp., 379 Mass. 220, 396
N.E.2d 996 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 935 (1980).
386. Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 983 (D.C. Cir. 1984). See also Gross, Opinions Left
Unprotected by Supreme Court Ruling, Pa. L.J.-Rep., Aug. 6, 1990, at 4, col. 1; supra note 341
(need to protect opinion-journalism).
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to journalists and commentators in reporting controversial topics. 387
The quest for truth and knowledge may be fulfilled only if issues of pub-
lic importance are brought to the public's attention through opinion-
journalism.388
2. Policy Rationale
The core function of the first amendment is the preservation of the
freedom to think and speak as one pleases389 - the means essential to
the discovery and spread of truth.3 ° In New York Times, the Court reit-
erated that our society has a vital interest in allowing everyone to speak
one's mind and newspapers to publish views on matters of public con-
cern.391 ' The Gertz holding assumed that information about matters that
are communicated publicly through the media are normally of legitimate
interest and importance to the general public.392 Therefore, no informa-
tion should be deemed not newsworthy unless, if true, its publication
would constitute such an outrageous example of offensive conduct as to
result in an invasion of privacy.393
The guarantee of an uninhibited press protects not only the interests
of the media, but also those of the public.394 In a government whose
authority rests upon the consent of the governed, freedom of the press
must be the most treasured principle. 395 The central purpose of freedom
of speech is to give every voting member of the body politic the fullest
possible participation in the understanding of the problems with which
387. Oilman, 750 F.2d at 983.
388. See id.
389. Olman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 1002 (Bork, J., concurring). This has been referred to
as the self-fulfillment function of free speech. In Professor Melville Nimmer's words, the "na-
ture of man is such that he can realize the fulfillment of self only if he is able to speak without
restraint." R. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 1.07[2], at 1-19 (1990) (quoting M. NIM-
MER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1984)).
390. Oilman, 750 F.2d at 1002 (Bork, J., concurring) (quoting Whitney v. California, 274
U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
391. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 298-99 (1964).
392. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON § 113, at 807-08 (5th ed. 1984).
393. Id. at 808.
394. Note, The Fact-Opinion Distinction in First Amendment Libel Law: The Need for a
Bright-Line Rule, 72 GEO. L.J. 1817, 1851 (1984). See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389
(1967) (stating that first amendment guarantees "are not for the benefit of the press so much as
for the benefit of all of us").
395. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2715 (quoting Edwards v. National
Audubon Soc'y, Inc., 556 F.2d 113, 115 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Edwards v. New York
Times Co., 434 U.S. 1002 (1977)).
This is also known as the political self-governance function of free speech, as espoused by
Dr. Alexander Meiklejohn. R. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 1.07[3], at 1-19 to 1-20
(1990).
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the citizens of a self-governing society must deal.3 96 A broadly defined
freedom of the press assures the maintenance of our political system and
an open society. 97
The commentary and editorial pages of newspapers play a signifi-
cant role in providing the public with a forum for free expression of con-
flicting points of view.398 When readers disagree with the commentary
and editorials they see, they may reply with their own counterarguments,
thereby carrying out the free and vigorous discussion of public issues
anticipated by the first amendment.399 Constitutional protection of free
speech contemplates and encompasses vehement, caustic and sometimes
unpleasantly sharp attacks on individuals regarding issues of public inter-
est.4°° Misstatements or errors that occur in the course of vigorous pub-
lic discourse are, in the long run, essential to enlightened opinion."
Conjecture and public debate fuel national discourse on popular issues
and stimulate pressure for answers from those who know more." 2 In
light of these public goals and considerations, journalists should not be
penalized for producing commentary that, although not false, can be said
to create a false impression in their readers' minds." 3
Thus, strong public interests exist in allowing the news media the
privilege of publishing whatever is reasonably regarded as true and news-
worthy.' The press has the right as well as the obligation to inform the
public through editorial and opinion journalism, however harsh, on any
matter of public interest.4°5 A contrary position could only inhibit the
scope of public discussion on matters of general interest and Concern.
4
0
6
Given these concerns, the Milkovich Court should have shielded forums
396. R. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 1.07[3], at 1-20 (1990).
397. Id.
398. See Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2714 (observing that the public and press regularly ex-
amine the activities of those who affect our lives, and that "one of the prerogatives of Ameri-
can citizenship is the right to criticize men and measures") (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v.
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 51 (1988) (quoting Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 673-74
(1944))).
This policy rationale is known as the broader enlightenment function of free speech, serv-
ing non-political social interests such as knowledge, intelligence, and sensitivity to human val-
ues. See R. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 1.07[4], at 1-20 to 1-21 (1990).
399. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2714 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
400. Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 255, 496 N.E.2d 699, 709 (1986) (Douglas,
J., concurring) (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
401. See id. at 255, 496 N.E.2d at 710.
402. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2714 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
403. Levine, Fear and Libel in the Newsroom, Tex. Law., Aug. 13, 1990, at 22.
404. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 113, at 807-08 (1984).
405. Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 262, 496 N.E.2d 699, 715 (1986) (Wright,
J., concurring).
406. Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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of free expression, in which the exchange of conflicting perspectives fur-
thers public understanding of important social issues."
V. IMPLICATIONS OF MILKOVICH v LORAIN JOURNAL CO.
A. Impact on Media: Journalists and Publishers
The Milkovich holding unquestionably narrowed the constitutional
shield for defamation liability."° In a period of already resurging libel
actions, 4 9 increased litigation against newspapers and commentators is
407. See supra text accompanying notes 398-406.
408. Greenhouse, High Court Narrows Shield in Libel Law, N.Y. Times, June 22, 1990, at
A17, col. 4.
409. Ollman, 750 F.2d at 996 (Bork, J., concurring). See also Smolla, Let the Author Be-
ware: The Rejuvenation of the American Law of Libel, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1983) (observing
that America is in the midst of a rejuvenation of the law of libel). The following listing of
recent libel claims aptly illustrates the trend:
1. Former Governor Edward J. King of Massachusetts filed a $3.6 million suit against
the Boston Globe for implications conveyed by articles, editorials, and political cartoons that
King was "unfit and incapable of properly performing the duties of governor."
2. Former United States ambassador to Chile, Nathaniel Davis, and two of his ex-assist-
ants filed a $150 million suit against the makers of "Missing," alleging that the 1982 film
implied that the American embassy was connected with the killing of an American free-lance
writer during the 1973 coup d'etat in Chile.
3. Public interest advocate Ralph Nader sued Ralph de Toledano for de Toledano's
statements in a syndicated column regarding Nader's crusade against the lack of safety in
General Motors' Corvair car.
4. Feminist attorney Gloria Allred filed a $10 million libel suit against a California state
senator, who allegedly characterized her as a "slick butch lawyeress" in a press release.
5. Carol Burnett sued the National Enquirer in a $10 million libel action, and received a
$1.6 million verdict from the jury.
6. Wayne Newton sued NBC for a report linking him with organized crime.
7. Elizabeth Taylor filed an action against ABC over a docu-drama depicting her life.
8. Writer Norman Mailer filed a $7 million libel suit against the New York Post, claim-
ing that the newspaper defamed him in reports about the trial of writer Jack Henry Abbott.
9. Kimerli Jayne Pring, Miss Wyoming of 1978, was awarded $26 million (later reversed
on appeal) by a federal court jury in a suit against Penthouse magazine.
10. E. Howard Hunt sued a weekly newspaper called the Spotlight regarding a story
linking him to the assassination of John F. Kennedy, and was awarded $650,000 in damages by
a Miami federal jury.
11. William Tavoulareas, president of Mobile Oil, was awarded more than $2 million in
a suit against the Washington Post for an article claiming that Tavoulareas had used his influ-
ence to set up his son in business.
12. Writer Lillian Helman sued Mary McCarthy for $2.25 million over McCarthy's
statements regarding Helman's writing on the Dick Cavett show.
13. Former President Jimmy Carter publicly threatened to sue the Washington Post for
a gossip column relaying rumors that Blair House had been bugged during Ronald and Nancy
Reagan's residence there before Reagan's inauguration. Following a retraction and published
letter of apology by the Post, Carter chose not to file suit. Smolla, supra, at 2-4 (referring to
cases 1-13).
14. Senator Paul Laxalt sued the Sacramento Bee for $250 million.
15. Ariel Sharon claimed $50 million dollars in damages against Time magazine.
16. Bestselling novelist Jackie Collins was awarded $40 million by a jury in her suit
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likely to result from the decision.4 ' One expert predicts that celebrities
and other subjects of criticism will fire back at editorialists who write
worst-dressed lists or hint at promiscuity, drug addiction, or unprofes-
sional conduct.41' For reasons discussed below,412 cases will proceed
fully to trial, escalating legal expenses and diverting time to protracted
litigation, perhaps for as long as a decade.4" 3 Legal fees in the recent
unappealed libel case brought by General William Westmoreland against
CBS reached an estimated three to six million dollars.4 14 Defending such
against Larry Flynt, publisher of Hustler magazine. See Note, Fact and Opinion in Defama-
tion: Recognizing the Formative Power of Context, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 766 (1990) (re-
ferring to cases 14-16).
17. The Philadelphia Inquirer has appealed a $34 million libel award in a suit brought
by a former district attorney, and has lost a libel suit brought by two Pennsylvania Supreme
Court justices.
18. In November, 1990, Washington apple growers filed a $150 million libel suit against
CBS and the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., a New York City-based environmental
public interest group, alleging that a biased "60 Minutes" report led to a government ban on
the preservative Alar that caused apple sales to plummet.
19. LA Gear, Inc., a sportswear firm with annual sales of $900 million, sued a small
newsletter, Sporting Goods Intelligence, charging that an erroneous news story hurt the firm's
sales to distributors. Moore, Press Clipping, 22 NAT'L J. 3086 (1990) (referring to cases 17-19).
410. Resnick, Florida Case Tests Libel Ruling, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 24, 1990, at 27, col. 3 (quot-
ing Bruce Sanford). In the few months since the Supreme Court's June decision, a number of
state and federal lawsuits have been filed, seeking to take advantage of the Milkovich ruling. In
one case, Moldea v. New York Times Co., No. 90-2053 (D.D.C. filed Aug. 23, 1990), the
plaintiff seeks ten million dollars as compensation for a statement in a book review protraying
him as a "sloppy and incompetent journalist." "Sloppy" is the harshest word used by the
author who reviewed the plaintiff's book. Id. at col. 2; Streitfeld, Author Sues Over Negative
Review; Criticism Was Libelous, D. C. Writer Charges, Wash. Post, Aug. 24, 1990, at C2, col. 1.
In Florida, a non-profit arts society sued a local newspaper and its entertainment writer,
seeking damages for an allegedly defamatory series of news stories, an editorial, and a letter to
the editor. The suit, Performing Arts Society of Stuart, Inc. v. Pine, No. 90-712-CA (Fla. Cir.
Ct. filed July 16, 1990), claims against the Stuart News, which is owned by Scripps Howard,
the country's eighth largest newspaper chain. Id. at 27, col. 1-3. See Suing the Reviewer,
Wash. Post, Aug. 26, 1990, at C6, col. I (regarding the Moldea suit).
See also supra notes 24, 409 (regarding proliferation and resurgence of libel suits,
respectively).
411. Streitfeld, Author Sues Over Negative Review; Criticism Was Libelous, D.C. Writer
Charges, Wash. Post, Aug. 24, 1990, at C2, col. 1 (quoting attorney Bruce Sanford).
412. See infra text accompanying notes 444-54 (reasons why libel suits may proceed fully to
trial).
413. Streitfeld, Author Sues Over Negative Review; Criticism Was Libelous, D.C. Writer
Charges, Wash. Post, Aug. 24, 1990, at Cl, col. I (quoting attorney Bruce Sanford). See Com-
ment, Statements of Fact, Statements of Opinion, and the First Amendment, 74 CALIF. L. REV.
1001, 1026 (1986) (stating that the defense of a libel suit can be both economically and psycho-
logically expensive for a publisher).
414. Comment, Statements of Fact, Statements of Opinion, and the First Amendment, 74
CALIF. L. REV. 1001, 1027 (1986). In Westmoreland v. CBS, 8 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2493
(D.S.C. 1982), Westmoreland sued CBS for allegedly suggesting his complicity or incompe-
tence in connection with the underestimation of enemy troop strength levels in Vietnam. De-
fense of Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979) - a case that never went to trial - cost an
estimated three to four million dollars. Id.
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suits will place an onerous and perhaps devastating financial burden on
the press.415
More importantly, fear of such prolonged and devastatingly costly
lawsuits may suppress media coverage of controversial issues through
self-censorship.4" 6 One commentator has described the Milkovich deci-
sion as "ugly" because it endorses a jurisprudence that encourages jour-
nalists "to be timid, to pull their punches, and to watch their words."41 '
Fearing the possibility of libel suits, the press may refrain from printing
even material that is non-defamatory.41 8 Commentators may be deterred
from voicing criticism, even though they believe it is true, and it is in fact
true, because of doubt over whether it can be proven in court or due to
fear of the expense of doing so. 4 1 '9 This self-censorship would dampen
the vigor and variety of public debate, and impair the unfettered exercise
of first amendment freedoms.42' Thus, the Milkovich decision may rein-
415. See Garbus, Courting Libel, 251 THE NATION 548 (1990); Moore, Press Clipping, 22
NAT'L J. 3086 (1990) (reporting that lawyers for a small newsletter sued for libel by LA Gear,
Inc., a large sportswear firm, say that the cost of litigation threatens the newsletter's future).
416. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 367-68 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting:
It is not simply the possibility of a judgment for damages that results in self-censor-
ship. The very possibility of having to engage in litigation, an expensive and pro-
tracted process, is threat enough to cause discussion and debate to "steer far wider of
the unlawful zone" thereby keeping protected discussion from public cognizance.
(quoting Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52-53 (1971)).
417. Levine, Fear and Libel in the Newsroom, Tex. Law., Aug. 13, 1990, at 22. See also The
Supreme Court, 1989 Term-Leading Cases, 104 HARV. L. REV. 219, 224 (1990) (stating that
the Milkovich Court's failure to provide clear rules for determining when a statement is action-
able raises the specter of self-censorship).
418. Note, The Fact-Opinion Distinction in First Amendment Libel Law: The Need for a
Bright-Line Rule, 72 GEO. L.J. 1817, 1818 n.12, 1845 (1984). See also Comment, Statements
of Fact, Statements of Opinion, and the First Amendment, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1001, 1025 (1986)
(noting that the expense of defending against libel suits and the possibility of large jury verdicts
cause publishers to avoid controversial issues, even though not all statements about controver-
sial issues are libelous).
419. Note, The Fact-Opinion Distinction in First Amendment Libel Law: The Need for a
Bright-Line Rule, 72 GEO. L.J. 1817, 1848 (1984) (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964)).
420. Note, The Fact-Opinion Distinction in First Amendment Libel Law: The Need for a
Bright-Line Rule, 72 GEo. L.J. 1817, 1845, 1848 (1984). See also Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S.
374, 389 (1967) (noting that the fear of large verdicts in damage suits for innocent or merely
negligent misstatement, and fear of the expense involved in their defense, must inevitably cause
publishers to steer wider of the unlawful zone and thus avoid the danger that the legitimate
utterance will be penalized); Moffatt v. Brown, 751 P.2d 939 (Alaska 1988) ("The threat of
being put to the defense of a lawsuit brought by a popular public official [or public figure] may
be as chilling to the exercise of [f]irst [a]mendment freedoms as fear of the outcome of the
lawsuit itself, especially to advocates of unpopular causes .... Unless persons, including news-
papers, desiring to exercise their [f]irst [a]mendment rights are assured freedom from harass-
ment of lawsuits, they will tend to become self-censors" (quoting Washington Post Co. v.
Keogh, 365 F.2d 965, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1011 (1967)); The Supreme
Court, 1989 Term-Leading Cases, 104 HARV. L. REV. 219 (1990) (suggesting that the uncer-
tainty in defamation law perpetuated by the Milkovich Court's decision may lead the press to
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force a chilling effect on public debate in the press."'
Another consequence of the Milkovich decision may be that written
commentary will become irresponsible and exaggerated.422  The
Milkovich rule exempted from defamation liability only statements of
rhetorical hyperbole or imaginative expression that could not reasonably
be interpreted as stating actual facts about an individual.423 Under
Milkovich, only words so loosely figurative that no reasonable person
would believe the writer intended them seriously, will qualify as pro-
tected opinion.424 Ironically, an author who expresses a moderately
noncomplimentary opinion about an individual will be more likely to in-
cur a defamation lawsuit than an author who engages in vicious name-
calling.4 25 A milder accusation, such as "liar," may be actionable if it is
found to imply defamatory facts. On the other hand, a stronger allega-
tion of sexual misconduct or criminal blackmail, made in a satirical or
politically charged context, will be inactionable if it is held that no reader
would infer false fact from the statement.426
The anomaly is that a writer may print anything, no matter how
outrageous, as long as no reasonable reader believes it.427 As a result,
journalists may exaggerate their statements to ensure that the public eas-
not publish protected statements rather than risk defamation liability, to the detriment of pub-
lic discourse).
421. An official of the Society of Professional Journalists predicted that public debate would
take a more cautious turn in the press. Sitomer, Can 'Opinion' Be Libelous?, Christian Sci.
Monitor, Aug. 9, 1990, at 14, col. 2.
422. Id. at 14, col. 2-3.
423. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2706 (1990) (quoting Hustler Maga-
zine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988)).
424. Gross, Opinions Left Unprotected by Supreme Court Ruling, Pa. L.J.-Rep., Aug. 6,
1990, at 4, col. 3.
425. See Cox, Lawyer Wins $1.6 Million Libel Award, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 5, 1990, at 13, col. 3
(quoting Judith Epstein, a media lawyer at Oakland's Crosby, Heafey, Roach & May, and
journalism instructor at the University of California, Berkeley, as saying, "Four months ago,
'Asshole of the Month' was okay to print, and now you can't say 'arrogant' "); Streitfeld,
Author Sues Over Negative Review; Criticism Was Libelous, D. C. Writer Charges, Wash. Post,
Aug. 24, 1990, at C2, col. 1-2 (quoting media attorney Bruce Sanford: "If you call someone a
'jerk' or a 'horse's ass' or 'lousy,' those are ... clearly words of opinion. But if you begin to
imply something, there's a problem. When you call someone 'nuts' or 'loony tunes,' are you
implying they're emotionally disturbed? In the old days, we'd say clearly not. After
Milkovich, one wonders"). See also Moldea v. New York Times, No. 90-2053 (D.D.C. filed
Aug. 23, 1990).
426. Note, Fact and Opinion in Defamation: Recognizing the Formative Power of Context, 58
FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 762 (1990). See also Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46
(1988); Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970); R. SMOLLA, LAW OF
DEFAMATION § 6.12[10], at 6-52 (1990); Gross, Opinions Left Unprotected by Supreme Court
Ruling, Pa. L.J.-Rep., Aug. 6, 1990, at 4, col. 3.
427. Gross, Opinions Left Unprotected by Supreme Court Ruling, Pa. L.J.-Rep., Aug. 6,
1990, at 4, col. 3.
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ily perceives them as rhetorical hyperbole rather than fact. 28 The
Milkovich decision may encourage irresponsible overstatement at the ex-
pense of well-reasoned analysis, as editorialists seek to shield themselves
from libel suits.4 2 9 This result weakens the viability of the Court's hold-
ing and contradicts society's interest in honest and creditable journalism.
B. Effects on Libel Litigation and Media Counsel
The significance of the Milkovich decision will depend primarily on
its treatment by state appellate courts.43° The Milkovich rule will auto-
matically govern only in areas of federal law where opinion issues
arise.431 Although state courts may continue to provide broad protection
to opinion,432 many may be swayed by the influential 7-2 decision in
Milkovich.433
428. See Sitomer, Can 'Opinion' Be Libelous?, Christian Sci. Monitor, Aug. 9, 1990, at 14,
col. 2-3.
429. Greenhouse, High Court Narrows Shield in Libel Law, N.Y. Times, June 22, 1990, at
A17, col. 6.
430. Clayton, High Court: No Federal Privilege for 'Opinion' Found Defamatory, Nat'l L.J.,
Aug. 27, 1990, at 28, col. 1.
431. Id.
432. Id. State constitutions often provide for broader protection of speech and press rights
than is provided under the first amendment. State statutory and common law, in areas such as
the fair comment doctrine, grant additional protection by requiring proof of a false and defam-
atory statement of fact. Warren, Heinke & Sager, Not as Bad as It Looks, Nat'l L.J., July 30,
1990, at 14, col. 3-4.
433. Clayton, High Court: No Federal Privilege for 'Opinion' Found Defamatory. Nat'l L.J.,
Aug. 27, 1990, at 28, col. 1. See Cox, Lawyer Wins $1.6 Million Libel Award, Nat'l L.J., Nov.
5, 1990, at 13 (discussing O'Connor v. McGraw-Hill, No. C437421 (L.A. Super. Ct. Oct. 19,
1990), in which Judge Ernest Zack applied the Milkovich decision retroactively. After a three-
week trial, the jury awarded plaintiff O'Connor $1.6 million in compensatory damages against
Business Week for printing a quote about the possible "arrogance" of an unnamed attorney,
who was the plaintiff. A cover story describing how Eastman Kodak Company had lost out to
Fuji Photo Film in a bid to be an official sponsor of the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing
Committee's 1984 Games stated: "[A] Kodak attorney picking over contract language de-
clared, 'After all, this is Eastman Kodak,' recalls Daniel D. Greenwood, who is in charge of
sponsorships for the LAOOC. It appeared to be a lack of enthusiasm, an arrogance." Alleg-
edly, O'Connor was the only Kodak attorney negotiating with the Olympics. O'Connor
claimed that Kodak fired him immediately, after seven years of favorable evaluations, with the
explanation that he had "become visible." O'Connor, 48 years old, is now an associate at a
four-lawyer law firm in New York, allegedly making less than half of his former salary).
See also Immuno A.G. v. Moor-Jankowski, 18 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1625 (1991) (finding
that defendant's letter to the editor "could be actionable" under Milkovich since it was "impos-
sible to state with complete certainty that some of the statements previously considered pro-
tected opinion, because of the language and format of the speech, would not now be viewed as
implied assertions of fact." The court concluded, however, that plaintiff's complaint had been
properly dismissed because: (1) plaintiff had not met its burden of showing the falsity of the
factual assertions; and (2) under independent state law, context separated actionable fact from
opinion); Anderson, Judge Dismisses Libel Suit Against New York Hospital, N.Y. L.J., Aug.
17, 1990, at 1 (discussing Zion v. Bensel (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 1990), in which Justice Baer, Jr.,
of New York County Supreme Court, IA Part 11, concluded that a hospital attorney's lan-
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The most probable effect of the Milkovich ruling on libel litigation
will be a proliferation of libel suits434 and a prolonging of libel actions in
the courts.435 Experts have predicted that the Milkovich decision will
encourage individuals to bring defamation actions alleging implications
of defamatory fact from opinion.436 Private lay defendants may be sub-
ject to an increasing number of libel suits by plaintiffs whose true motives
are intimidation or harassment. 437 Future defendants may include citi-
zens who write letters to the editor and are sued by real estate developers
or corporate giants with deep pockets and a vengeful purpose.438 These
lay defendants lack the resources that newspapers possess to fund the
payment of costly legal fees.4 39 Devastatingly expensive lawsuits may de-
ter members of the public from strongly criticizing others and their
activities.' 0
Other libel experts expect increased litigation on the distinction be-
tween actionable fact-laden opinion and non-actionable rhetorical hyper-
bole and imaginative expression.44 ' This debate caused the Milkovich
Court to split 7-2.442 Courts may also see additional litigation as to
whether particular states may continue to retain an absolute privilege for
opinion implicating fact under the provisions of their constitutions.
guage was constitutionally protected under Milkovich because it could not be interpreted as
stating actual facts about an individual. Referring to a pending malpractice action stemming
from the death of plaintiff's daughter, the attorney had stated, "[plaintiff journalist and law-
yer] Mr. Zion has chosen to manifest [his] grief by reckless and malicious attacks on the physi-
cians who took care of his daughter .... Mr. Zion's accusations will be shown to have been
both unfair and unfounded. It is unfortunate that Mr. Zion with his unique access to public
forums (sic) is in a position to gain such widespread publicity for his uninformed invective."
Judge Baer found that the charge clearly was a statement of the hospital's litigation positions,
and that the statements were so inherently subjective as not to be susceptible to precise deter-
mination of truth or falsity).
For a federal court decision applying Milkovich, see Unelko Corp. v. Rooney, 912 F.2d
1049, 1055-57 (1990) (finding that Andy Rooney's words on the television program "60 Min-
utes" were not protected as opinion under the Milkovich decision, but holding that the district
court properly granted summary judgment on Unelko's defamation claim because Unelko's
evidence did not demonstrate that Rooney's statements were false or implied false assertions of
fact).
434. See supra note 24 (increased libel litigation after Milkovich).
435. Goodale, Opinions Left Unprotected by Supreme Court Ruling, Pa. L.J.-Rep., Aug. 6,
1990, at 2, col. 5.
436. See supra note 24 (increased libel litigation after Milkovich).
437. Hentoff, Wrestling With the First Amendment, Wash. Post, June 30, 1990, at A19, col.
1.
438. Id.
439. Id
440. Id.
441. Goodale, Opinions Left Unprotected by Supreme Court Ruling, Pa. L.J.-Rep., Aug. 6,
1990, at 2, col. 5.
442. Id.
443. Id.
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Furthermore, libel litigation will likely become protracted, as cases
that previously would have been dismissed on summary judgment are
prolonged or proceed fully to trial."' Prior to the Milkovich holding,
courts resolved determinations of opinion as questions of law." 5 Most
libel suits were thrown out by judges granting motions to dismiss based
on the theory that the disputed statement was absolutely protected as
opinion by the Constitution. ' 6 Now, since the central issue is whether a
reasonable factfinder could conclude that an opinion implies defamatory
facts, many statements that would have been ruled opinion because of
their context will survive summary judgment." 7
With the Court's indication that the opinion issue is a question of
fact,44 it will be substantially more difficult to prevent libel claims based
on opinion implicating fact from going to the jury." 9 One reason is that
the Court's obliteration of opinion as a constitutional defense will neces-
sitate a more intense intellectual analysis by courts and media defend-
ants.450 Detailed analysis of the kind required to determine close
questions of non-actionability may lead some trial judges to evade their
responsibility in favor of deference to a jury.45' The requirement that
plaintiffs prove allegedly defamatory statements were made with knowl-
edge of their false implications or with reckless disregard of their truth
452
will also prolong litigation.45' Dismissal will be delayed until the out-
come of pre-trial discovery or after a trial itself.
45 4
The danger of allowing juries to determine libel claims is that the
number of costly damage awards may increase.455 Typically, juries are
444. See Marcus & Pink, Statements of Opinion Can Be Libelous, Court Rules; Expressions
With 'False and Defamatory' Facts Not Automatically Shielded, Justices Find, Wash. Post, Jun.
22, 1990, at A17, col. 1; Goodale, Opinions Left Unprotected by Supreme Court Ruling, Pa.
L.J.-Rep., Aug. 6, 1990, at 2, col. 4-5.
445. Clayton, High Court: No Federal Privilege for 'Opinion' Found Defamatory, Nat'l L.J.,
Aug. 27, 1990, at 28, col. 1.
446. See Goodale, Opinions Left Unprotected by Supreme Court Ruling, Pa. L.J.-Rep., Aug.
6, 1990, at 2, col. 4-5. See also Garbus, Courting Libel, 251 THE NATION 548 (1990) (stating
that, presently, more than 80% of all libel cases are dismissed prior to trial).
447. Clayton, High Court: No Federal Privilege for 'Opinion' Found Defamatory, Nat'l L.J.,
Aug. 27, 1990, at 28, col. 1.
448. Id. at 27, col. 1.
449. Id.
450. Gross, Opinions Left Unprotected by Supreme Court Ruling, Pa. L.J.-Rep., Aug. 6,
1990, at 8, col. 4.
451. Id.
452. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2707 (1990).
453. Goodale, High Court: No Federal Privilege for 'Opinion'Found Defamatory, Nat'l L.J.,
Aug. 27, 1990, at 2, col. 5.
454. Id.
455. See Smolla, Let the Author Beware: The Rejuvenation of the American Law of Libel,
132 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 4 (1983); Gross, Opinions Left Unprotected by Supreme Court Ruling,
Pa. L.J.-Rep., Aug. 6, 1990, at 8, col. 4.
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less sympathetic than judges to opinion defenses, and are much more
likely to find for the plaintiff in a defamation case.456 According to two
studies done in the early 1980s, the average initial damage award in libel
suits against the media was over two million dollars, with an additional
two million in punitive damages.457 In one recent case on appeal, a jury
awarded the plaintiff $47.5 million.45 Such judgments may threaten the
financial viability of the press. 459 Although jury awards can be reduced,
the risk that they will be upheld often leads to generous settlements.
4 60
In fact, data show not only a trend toward more generous jury awards,
but a corresponding trend toward the media's settlement of suits at a
substantial cost.461 The chilling effect that fear of libel suits places on the
media is intensified in the case of local newspaper publishers who cannot
afford high damage awards or settlement costs.
462
Furthermore, libel law experts fear that the Milkovich ruling will
456. Clayton, High Court: No Federal Privilege for 'Opinion' Found Defamatory, Nat'l L.J.,
Aug. 27, 1990, at 28, col. 1-2; Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 1006 (Bork, J., concurring)
(referring to evidence showing that juries do not give adequate attention to limits imposed by
the first amendment); Moore, Press Clipping, 22 NAT'L J. 3086 (1990) (according to C.
Thomas Dienes, a professor at George Washington University Law Center who represents The
Atlantic and U.S. News & World Report, the news media lose two-thirds of the libel cases that
go to a jury, but judges reverse or dismiss by summary judgment four-fifths of all libel cases in
which the court rules on a point of law, rather than the specific facts of a case).
457. Note, Fact and Opinion in Defamation: Recognizing the Formative Power of Context, 58
FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 766 (1990). Libel plaintiffs also tend to win before the jury more often
than other tort plaintiffs, at a rate from 55% to 85% (compared with a rate for medical mal-
practice plaintiffs of 30% to 40%). See also Smolla, Let the Author Beware: The Rejuvenation
of the American Law of Libel, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 7 (1983) (reporting that recent data from
the Libel Defense Resource Center [LDRC] indicate a staggering average of almost $8 million
per punitive award in libel suits). The LDRC is a New York-based information clearinghouse
organized by media groups to monitor developments in libel law.
In 1988, the Supreme Court let stand a $3 million judgment against CBS, Inc., in a case
brought by Brown & Williamson, Co. in response to a statement by a Chicago anchorman at a
CBS-owned television station that the tobacco company improperly tried to encourage adoles-
cents to smoke. The largest libel judgment ever paid by a newspaper was $2.8 million, by the
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette for accusing an attorney of misconduct in drafting a will for a Penn-
sylvania millionaire. Moore, Press Clipping, 22 NAT'L J. 3086 (1990).
458. Comment, Statements of Fact, Statements of Opinion, and the First Amendment, 74
CALIF. L. REV. 1001, 1027 & n.151 (1986).
459. Id.
460. Id A suit brought by Philadephia Mayor William J. Green against a CBS television
station for $5.1 million (for reporting that he was under federal criminal investigation) was
ultimately settled for between $250,000 and $400,000. Smolla, Let the Author Beware: The
Rejuvenation of the American Law of Libel, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2 & n.8 (1983).
461. Smolla, Let the Author Beware: The Rejuvenation of the American Law of Libel, 132 U.
PA. L. REV. 1, 4, 6 & n.40 (1983) (citing studies conducted by the LDRC and by Professor
Marc Franklin).
462. Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 255, 496 N.E.2d 699, 710 (1986) (Douglas,
J., concurring).
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restore confusion in a body of law that had become orderly." 3 The cru-
cial question of whether an opinion incorporates actionable assertions of
fact will have to be resolved on a case-by-case basis.4" From the
Milkovich Court's summary of the law of defamation, it appears that it
will not hear future first amendment press cases." 5 The Court's lack of
interest in this area leaves unresolved the need for constitutional protec-
tion for the press in areas of libel law such as punitive damages.' 66 The
Milkovich ruling may also lead to conflicting decisions by federal
courts.467 Lower courts will be left on their own to work out, on an ad
hoc basis, the principles catalogued in Milkovich. 4 61 Such a hesitation in
the development of libel law under the first amendment will do little to
encourage a robust press.469
Prior to the Milkovich decision, attorneys for journalists and novel-
ists had advised their clients that they need not fear libel litigation for
statements of opinion concerning others, whether or not they implicated
fact.47° However, following the Milkovich Court's eradication of broad
constitutional protection for opinion, media counsel will have to cease
that practice.471 A statement that expresses an opinion will no longer be
saved from defamation liability, if a reasonable person could conclude
that a statement implies a factual assertion.472
The practical result of the Milkovich decision on libel lawyers will be
to alter their counseling strategy. From now on, lawyers will need to
review their clients' work closely. If a statement in an article can be
characterized as opinion that implicates fact, then it may be advisable to
delete it.473 The lawyer should scrutinize the statement, however, to as-
sess if it may be safely characterized as imaginative opinion or rhetorical
463. Coyle & Strasser, Court Deals Blows to Patronage, Libel Privilege, Nat'l L. J., July 2,
1990, at 5, col. 3, at 16, col. 1 (quoting Bruce Sanford).
464. Greenhouse, High Court Narrows Shield in Libel Law, N.Y. Times, Jun. 22, 1990, at
A17, col. 6.
465. Gross, Opinions Left Unprotected by Supreme Court Ruling, Pa. L.J.-Rep., Aug. 6,
1990, at 8, col. 3-4.
466. Id at 8, col. 4.
467. Id. See also The Supreme Court, 1989 Term-Leading Cases, 104 HARV. L. REV. 219
(1990) (stating that the Milkovich Court's failure to provide lower courts with guidance in
determining whether an opinion meets criteria used to distinguish fact from opinion, perpetu-
ates the uncertainty that pervades the opinion privilege).
468. Gross, Opinions Left Unprotected by Supreme Court Ruling, Pa. L.J.-Rep., Aug. 6,
1990, at 8, col. 4.
469. Id.
470. Goodale, Opinions Left Unprotected by Supreme Court Ruling, Pa. L.J.-Rep., Aug. 6,
1990, at 2, col. 4.
471. Id.
472. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2707 (1990).
473. Id. See Goodale, Opinions Left Unprotected by Supreme Court Ruling, Pa. L.J.-Rep.,
Aug. 6, 1990, at 2, col. 4.
[Vol. I11
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
hyperbole.474 To protect their clients from libel actions (and themselves
from malpractice suits), media attorneys may counsel clients to err on
the side of conservatism.475 This pre-publication scrutiny may result in a
chilling of free expression by reporters and editorialists.476
VI. CONCLUSION
The freedom to think and speak as one pleases is one of our most
fundamental constitutional rights.4 77 In the Supreme Court's words,
"[t]he maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the
end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that
changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to
the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitu-
tional system."' 478 The early opponents of our Constitution objected to
its adoption on the ground that it contained no Bill of Rights to safe-
guard freedoms of religion, press, assembly, and speech against possible
attempts by a powerful central government to curtail these liberties.4 7 9
To address these concerns, James Madison proposed amendments to en-
sure that these freedoms would remain safe from governmental abridg-
ment.480 We cannot be absolutely certain of the precise intention of the
framers and ratifiers of the first amendment's speech and press clauses.481
In providing for these rights, however, the framers clearly meant to pre-
serve freedom of expression.482
Our country has a judicial tradition of continuously serving this cen-
tral purpose of the first amendment.48 3 Specific constitutional protection
is given to the press to safeguard it from the chilling effects of defamation
litigation.48 4 The goal is to avoid self-censorship, which results when
overbroad defamation standards stifle important non-defamatory mate-
474. Id.
475. See Marcus & Pink, Statements of Opinion Can Be Libelous, Court Rules; Expressions
With 'False and Defamatory' Facts Not Automatically Shielded, Justices Find, Wash. Post,
June 22, 1990, at A4, col. 1.
476. Id.
477. See Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 261, 496 N.E.2d 699, 714 (1986)
(Wright, J., concurring).
478. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1990) (quoting Stromberg v.
California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931)).
479. Scott, 25 Ohio St. 3d at 260, 496 N.E.2d at 714 (Douglas, J., concurring).
480. Id.
481. Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 996 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring).
482. Id.
483. Id. at 995 (Bork, J., concurring).
484. Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 261, 496 N.E.2d 699, 714 (1986) (Douglas,
J., concurring). See also Cooke, The Free Press: Essential to Robust Debates, 10 PACE L. REV.
1, 3 (1990) (former Justice Potter Stewart opined that the free press clause is a structural
provision of the Constitution, and that its primary effect is to protect editorial autonomy).
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rial.4 ' Contradicting this intent, the Milkovich decision may cause re-
porters to withhold newsworthy information from publication whenever
an opinion may implicate fact.48 6 Editors may censor stinging com-
ments, even from an Op-Ed page, to avoid the possibility of libel litiga-
tion. This threatened burden of self-censorship on the press can as
effectively stifle discussion and criticism as would overt governmental
regulation that the first amendment undoubtedly would not allow.48 We
must preserve protection for the press even at the cost of shielding the
expression of ideas we abhor, or eventually the protection of expression
may be denied to ideas we cherish.4 8
Although redressing injuries to an individual's reputation is undeni-
ably important, the danger to reputation is one that we have chosen to
tolerate in pursuit of individual knowledge, truth, and vitality in society
as a whole. 489 Essential to the preservation of freedom of speech is the
willingness of those who speak in our society to be spoken about.4" This
experience may not always be pleasant or painless, but it is a concession
that is necessary to maintain a vigorous and enlightened society.491 Em-
ploying first amendment law to make public dispute safe and comfortable
for all participants would only stifle debate.4 92
More crucial than protecting reputation is the public's interest in
receiving information on issues of public importance, even if the trust-
worthiness of the information is not absolutely certain. 49 a The nation's
collective interest in unhindered commentary and criticism can only be
served by opinion-journalism that, although not definitive, raises ques-
tions and prompts investigation or debate.494 Critical reviews of books,
plays, and restaurants are intended as guides for would-be consumers.493
Any chilling effect on free speech will be a disservice to the public, who
has the right to know not only the facts, but also the broader background
485. Scott, 25 Ohio St. 3d at 245, 496 N.E.2d at 702 (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974)).
486. See supra notes 416-21 and accompanying text (discussing threat of self-censorship).
487. OIlman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 996 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring).
488. Scott, 25 Ohio St. 3d at 261, 496 N.E.2d at 714 (1986) (Douglas, J., concurring).
489. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2715 (1990).
490. Olman, 750 F.2d at 1002 (Bork, J., concurring).
491. Id
492. Id. at 993.
493. Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 983 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see id. at 995 (Bork, J., concur-
ring) ("The American press is extraordinarily free and vigorous, as it should be. It should be,
not because it is free of inaccuracy, oversimplification, and bias, but because the alternative to
that freedom is worse than those failings").
494. Id. at 983.
495. Suing the Reviewer, Wash. Post, Aug. 26, 1990, at C6, col. 2.
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and implications of controversial situations.496
Our democratic society is founded on the freedom to voice objec-
tions to the status quo, and is dependent on the interplay of conflicting
viewpoints to inform "tself and its citizens.497 In balancing the concerns
reflected in the first amendment and defamation law, the Supreme Court
has stated that "whatever is added to the field of libel is taken from the
field of free debate. '49 ' Thus, every concession to libel almost certainly
results in a corresponding compromise to freedom of the press.499
Particular care must be taken to guard against detrimental effects
that the Milkovich decision may have on the exercise of free speech and
press rights."° Judges have a duty to ensure that these privileges, speci-
fied by the framers, are implemented in keeping with constitutional free-
dom.5"' Close judicial scrutiny of libel actions will help ensure that cases
involving types of writing essential to a vigorous first amendment do not
reach the jury."°2 Evidence has shown that juries do not give adequate
attention to constitutional limits, as they are unfamiliar with the legal
precedents protecting the press.
503
These concerns point to the conclusion that the Court has erred in
abandoning a constitutional exemption for statements deemed opinion,
and failing in the alternative to create a special shield to protect opinion-
journalism. Coupled with the Milkovich decision, the Supreme Court's
recent agreement to hear another case, involving no important issues of
libel law, 5" seems to indicate that the Rehnquist Court is cutting back
496. Sitomer, Can 'Opinion' Be Libelous?, Christian Sci. Monitor, Aug. 9, 1990, at 14, col.
4.
497. Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 245, 496 N.E.2d 699, 702 (1986) (citing Orr
v. Argus-Press Co., 586 F.2d 1108, 1117 (6th Cir. 1978)).
498. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 (1964).
499. Scott, 25 Ohio St. 3d at 256, 496 N.E.2d at 710 (Douglas, J., concurring).
500. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2715 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
501. Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 996 (1984) (Bork, J., concurring).
502. Id. at 997 (Bork, J., concurring). See also Moffatt v. Brown, 751 P.2d 939, 946
(Alaska 1988) (noting that the failure of courts to summarily dispose of libel cases where
warranted would chill the media's first amendment right to free speech by impeding th[e]
national commitment to "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate on public issues, as
stressed in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
503. Id. at 1006 (Bork, J., concurring); Moore, Press Clipping, 22 NAT'L J. 3086 (1990).
504. Masson v. The New Yorker Magazine, Inc., No. C-84-7548 EFL (N.D. Cal. filed Nov.
29, 1984). In Masson, psychoanalyst Jeffrey Masson brought suit against Janet Malcolm for
fabricating quotes attributed to Masson in an article published in the New Yorker. Malcolm
admitted inventing the quotes, in one of which Masson allegedly called himself "an intellectual
gigolo." The United States Court of Appeals in California held that, while Malcolm may have
been inaccurate, her accurate quotes outweighed her inaccurate ones, so she was not guilty of
actual malice under New York Times v. Sullivan. See Garbus, Courting Libel, 251 THE NA-
TION 548 (1990); Moore, Press Clipping, 22 NAT'L J. 3086 (1990).
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on the protections given to the press by New York Times v. Sullivan. 5
With diminishing constitutional protection, the press is in danger of be-
coming less vigorous, and the American public less well-informed and
open-minded. In the words of one writer, "'free speech' may now, more
than ever, be an oxymoron - in my opinion.""
Wun-ee Chelsea Chen
505. Garbus, Courting Libel, 251 THE NATION 548 (1990); Moore, Press Clipping, 22
NAT'L J. 3086 (1990) (quoting Rodney A. Smolla, director of the College of William and Mary
Law School's Institute of Bill of Rights Law, as warning, "The Court is going to cut back on
the edges [of New York Times v. Sullivan] everywhere it can"; the author also quotes Michael
P. McDonald, director of the Center for Individual Rights in Washington, an organization
that often represents libel plaintiffs, as stating, "The Court is not going to give the press the
benefit of the doubt as different justices might have in times past").
506. James, Free-Speech Cases Reveal Momentum of Restraint, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 13, 1990, at
SlI, col. 4.
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